Status and incentives
Renault, Régis; Auriol, Emmanuelle (2008), Status and incentives, RAND Journal of Economics, 39, 1, p. 305-326. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0741-6261.2008.00015.x
TypeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
Journal nameRAND Journal of Economics
MetadataShow full item record
Abstract (EN)The paper introduces status as re ecting an agent's claim to recognition in her work. It is a scarce resource: increasing an agent's status requires that another agent's status is decreased. Higher status agents are more willing to exert e ort in exchange for money; better-paid agents would exert a higher e ort in exchange for an improved status. Results are coherent with actual management practices: (i) egalitarianism is desirable in a static context; (ii) in a long-term work relationship, juniors' compensations are delayed; past performances are recompensed by pay increases along with an improved status within the organization's hierarchy.
Subjects / KeywordsRepeated moral hazard; internal labor markets; social status
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