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dc.contributor.authorTrannoy, Alain
dc.contributor.authorRenault, Régis
dc.date.accessioned2014-01-21T09:33:41Z
dc.date.available2014-01-21T09:33:41Z
dc.date.issued2011-12
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/12477
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectAverage votingen
dc.subjectNash equilibriumen
dc.subjectStrategic biasen
dc.subjectWeighten
dc.subject.ddc330.1en
dc.subject.classificationjelD74en
dc.subject.classificationjelH41en
dc.subject.classificationjelI22en
dc.titleAssessing the extent of strategic manipulation: the average vote exampleen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherUniversité de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA;France
dc.description.abstractenThe average voting procedure reflects the weighted average of expressed opinions in [0,1]. Participants typically behave strategically. We evaluate the discrepancy between the average taste and the average vote. If the population is sufficiently large, it is possible to construct approximations of both the average vote and the average taste which may be readily compared. We construct upper and lower bounds for the limit average vote that depend on the limit average taste. If the average taste is central enough, the range of possible values for the average voting outcome is narrower than the corresponding range for majority voting. For instance, if the average taste is at 1/2, the limit equilibrium outcome is this value plus or minus roughly .2, whereas the weighted median maybe anywhere in the [0,1] intervalen
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameSERIEs
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol2en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue4en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2011-12
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages497-513en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13209-011-0077-0en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherSpringer-Verlagen
dc.subject.ddclabelThéorie économiqueen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.relation.forthcomingprintnonen


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