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Assessing the extent of strategic manipulation: the average vote example

Trannoy, Alain; Renault, Régis (2011), Assessing the extent of strategic manipulation: the average vote example, SERIEs, 2, 4, p. 497-513. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13209-011-0077-0

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BarberaSERI.Renaul-Trannoy-Revised5.pdf (212.2Kb)
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2011-12
Journal name
SERIEs
Volume
2
Number
4
Publisher
Springer-Verlag
Pages
497-513
Publication identifier
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13209-011-0077-0
Metadata
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Author(s)
Trannoy, Alain
Renault, Régis
Abstract (EN)
The average voting procedure reflects the weighted average of expressed opinions in [0,1]. Participants typically behave strategically. We evaluate the discrepancy between the average taste and the average vote. If the population is sufficiently large, it is possible to construct approximations of both the average vote and the average taste which may be readily compared. We construct upper and lower bounds for the limit average vote that depend on the limit average taste. If the average taste is central enough, the range of possible values for the average voting outcome is narrower than the corresponding range for majority voting. For instance, if the average taste is at 1/2, the limit equilibrium outcome is this value plus or minus roughly .2, whereas the weighted median maybe anywhere in the [0,1] interval
Subjects / Keywords
Average voting; Nash equilibrium; Strategic bias; Weight
JEL
D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
H41 - Public Goods
I22 - Educational Finance; Financial Aid

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