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dc.contributor.authorRenault, Régis
dc.contributor.authorMa, Ching-to Albert
dc.contributor.authorAlger, Ingela
dc.date.accessioned2014-01-11T14:10:05Z
dc.date.available2014-01-11T14:10:05Z
dc.date.issued2012-01
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/12408
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectTheory of the firmen
dc.subjectVertical integrationen
dc.subjectexperience rentsen
dc.subjectinformational rentsen
dc.subjectCosten
dc.subjectInformationen
dc.subjectOrganizationen
dc.subject.ddc338.5en
dc.subject.classificationjelJ24en
dc.subject.classificationjelJ23en
dc.subject.classificationjelD82en
dc.subject.classificationjelD23en
dc.titleExperience Benefits and Firm Organizationen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherUniversité de Cergy-Pontoise;France
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherBoston University, Boston;États-Unis
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherCarleton University, Ottawa;Canada
dc.description.abstractenA principal needs a worker for the production of a good. The worker can be hired as an internal agent, or an external agent under a contract. These two organizational modes correspond to in-house production and outsourcing, respectively. In each case, the agent earns experience benefits: future monetary returns from managing production, reputation, and enjoyment. The principal would like to extract experience benefits, and can do so when production is outsourced. However, the external agent earns information rent from private information about production costs. The principal cannot fully extract experience benefits when production is in-house because the internal agent must be provided with a minimum income, although the principal has full information on production costs. Our theory proposes a new trade-off, one between information rent under outsourcing and experience rent under in-house production. The principal chooses outsourcing when experience benefits are high, but her organizational choice may be socially inefficient.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameThe B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol12en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue1en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2012-01
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpagesnon renseignéesen
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1515/1935-1682.2932en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherBerkeley Electronic Pressen
dc.subject.ddclabelMicroéconomieen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.relation.forthcomingprintnonen


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