
The Advertising Mix for a Search Good
Renault, Régis; Anderson, Simon P. (2013), The Advertising Mix for a Search Good, Management Science, 59, 1, p. 69-83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1120.1575
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Article accepté pour publication ou publiéDate
2013-01Journal name
Management ScienceVolume
59Number
1Publisher
INFORMS
Pages
69-83
Publication identifier
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Show full item recordAbstract (EN)
We extend the persuasion game to bring it squarely into the economics of advertising. We model advertising as exciting consumer interest into learning more about the product, and determine a firm's equilibrium choice of advertising content over quality information, price information, and horizontal match information. Equilibrium is unique whenever advertising is necessary. The outcome is a separating equilibrium with quality unravelling. Lower-quality firms need to provide more information. For a given quality level, as a function of consumer visit costs, first quality information is disclosed, then price information and then horizontal product information are added to the advertising mix. Some suggestive evidence is provided from airline ads in newspapers.Subjects / Keywords
Persuasion game; Search; Content analysis; Advertising; Equilibrium; Information; LearningRelated items
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