Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorKoessler, Frédéric
HAL ID: 740979
ORCID: 0000-0001-7707-4217
dc.contributor.authorRenault, Régis
dc.date.accessioned2014-01-11T12:50:40Z
dc.date.available2014-01-11T12:50:40Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/12406
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectBeliefen
dc.subjectEquilibriumen
dc.subjectEquilibrium Conditionsen
dc.subjectFirmen
dc.subjectFirmsen
dc.subjectInformationen
dc.subject.ddc338.5en
dc.subject.classificationjelL13en
dc.subject.classificationjelL12en
dc.subject.classificationjelD83en
dc.subject.classificationjelD43en
dc.subject.classificationjelD42en
dc.titleWhen Does a Firm Disclose Product Information?en
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenA firm chooses a price and the product information it discloses to a consumer whose tastes are privately known. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the match function for full disclosure to be the unique equilibrium outcome whatever the costs and prior beliefs about product and consumer types. It allows for products with different qualities as well as some horizontal match heterogeneity. With independently distributed product and consumer types, full disclosure is always an equilibrium and a necessary and sufficient equilibrium condition is that all firm types earn at least the full-disclosure profit.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameRAND Journal of Economics
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol43en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue4en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2012
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages630-649en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherWiley-Blackwellen
dc.subject.ddclabelMicroéconomieen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.relation.forthcomingprintnonen


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record