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When Does a Firm Disclose Product Information?

Koessler, Frédéric; Renault, Régis (2012), When Does a Firm Disclose Product Information?, RAND Journal of Economics, 43, 4, p. 630-649

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Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2012
Journal name
RAND Journal of Economics
Volume
43
Number
4
Publisher
Wiley-Blackwell
Pages
630-649
Metadata
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Author(s)
Koessler, Frédéric cc
Renault, Régis
Abstract (EN)
A firm chooses a price and the product information it discloses to a consumer whose tastes are privately known. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the match function for full disclosure to be the unique equilibrium outcome whatever the costs and prior beliefs about product and consumer types. It allows for products with different qualities as well as some horizontal match heterogeneity. With independently distributed product and consumer types, full disclosure is always an equilibrium and a necessary and sufficient equilibrium condition is that all firm types earn at least the full-disclosure profit.
Subjects / Keywords
Belief; Equilibrium; Equilibrium Conditions; Firm; Firms; Information
JEL
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D42 - Monopoly