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When Does a Firm Disclose Product Information?

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StrategicDisclosure110727.pdf (250.6Kb)
Date
2012
Dewey
Microéconomie
Sujet
Belief; Equilibrium; Equilibrium Conditions; Firm; Firms; Information
JEL code
L13; L12; D83; D43; D42
Journal issue
RAND Journal of Economics
Volume
43
Number
4
Publication date
2012
Article pages
630-649
Publisher
Wiley-Blackwell
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/12406
Collections
  • LEDa : Publications
Metadata
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Author
Koessler, Frédéric
Renault, Régis
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
A firm chooses a price and the product information it discloses to a consumer whose tastes are privately known. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the match function for full disclosure to be the unique equilibrium outcome whatever the costs and prior beliefs about product and consumer types. It allows for products with different qualities as well as some horizontal match heterogeneity. With independently distributed product and consumer types, full disclosure is always an equilibrium and a necessary and sufficient equilibrium condition is that all firm types earn at least the full-disclosure profit.

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