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dc.contributor.authorMinelli, Enrico
dc.contributor.authorForges, Françoise
dc.date.accessioned2013-12-18T14:39:18Z
dc.date.available2013-12-18T14:39:18Z
dc.date.issued1997-08
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/12327
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectNash equilibriumen
dc.subjectEquilibrium strategiesen
dc.subjectNon-cooperative gameen
dc.subjectGame-theoryen
dc.subject.ddc338.5en
dc.subject.classificationjelD82en
dc.subject.classificationjelC72en
dc.titleSelf-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectationsen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherUniversità di Brescia;Italie
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherUniversité de Cergy-Pontoise;France
dc.description.abstractenWe introduce a class of communication equilibria, which we call self-fulfilling mechanisms, and show that they provide a game-theoretic foundation to rational expectations equilibria. LetEbe an exchange economy with differential information. We associate a strategic market gameΓ(E) withE. We prove that the allocations achieved through a self-fulfilling mechanism inΓ(E) coincide with the rational expectations equilibrium allocations inE. In order to understand how self-fulfilment can be realized in a dynamic framework, we investigate the relationship between self-fulfilling mechanisms inΓ(E) and Nash equilibria of theT-stage repeated gameΓT(E)en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameJournal of Economic Theory
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol75en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue2en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate1997-08
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages388–406en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp/dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2290en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelMicroéconomieen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.relation.forthcomingprintnonen


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