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dc.contributor.authorBrousseau, Eric
dc.contributor.authorGlachant, Jean-Michel
dc.date.accessioned2013-12-12T17:01:44Z
dc.date.available2013-12-12T17:01:44Z
dc.date.issued2011-09
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/12281
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectInnovationen
dc.subjectNetworken
dc.subjectRegulationen
dc.subjectTechnologyen
dc.subjectTechnologieen
dc.subjectRégulationen
dc.subjectRecherche industrielleen
dc.subjectInnovationsen
dc.subjectTransporten
dc.subject.ddc338en
dc.subject.classificationjelL14en
dc.subject.classificationjelL97en
dc.subject.classificationjelL98en
dc.subject.classificationjelO31en
dc.subject.classificationjelL51en
dc.subject.classificationjelL91en
dc.titleRegulators as Reflexive Governance Platformsen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherFlorence School of Regulation;Italie
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherEuropean University Institute;Italie
dc.description.abstractenNetwork industries are now characterized by a regime of permanent innovation, while they continue to be fixed and sunk cost industries, due to the high level of investments in R&D and infrastructures. Players in these industries need to coordinate their investments; hence a threat of collusion. In the same time competition is fierce due to the opportunities brought by innovations; hence the permanent risk of catastrophic evolutions due to systemic interdependencies. To balance this dilemma between coordination and competition, independent third parties granted with capabilities to influence the "rules of the game" are needed. They need however to access critical information and knowledge. Coordination of investments requires figuring out the possible futures of the technology and of the industry. Avoiding oligopoly capture relies on an understanding of costs and business models. Since the relevant information and knowledge are dispersed and permanently evolving, regulators have to organize fora in which the stakeholders have incentives to reveal information, both because they need to learn from others, and because they seek to influence the industry regulation. Properly organized fora establish an open information competition among stakeholders, which can be penalized if they hide or distort information too much.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameCompetition and Regulation in Network Industries
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol12en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue3en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2011-09
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages194-209en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherMortsel Intersentiaen
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie industrielleen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.relation.forthcomingprintnonen


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