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dc.contributor.authorThang, Nguyen Kim
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-14T08:59:12Z
dc.date.available2013-10-14T08:59:12Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/11818
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectGSP mechanismsen
dc.subjectSP mechanismsen
dc.subject.ddc5en
dc.titleOn (Group) Strategy-Proof Mechanisms without Payment for Facility Location Gamesen
dc.typeCommunication / Conférence
dc.description.abstractenWe characterize the performance of strategyproof and group-strategyproof social choice rules, for placing a facility on the nodes of a metric network inhabited by N autonomous self-interested agents. Every agent owns a set of locations and caters to minimization of its cost which is the total distance from the facility to its locations. Agents may misreport their locations, so as to manipulate the outcome. A central authority has a set of allowable locations where the facility could be opened. The authority must devise a mechanism that, given the agents reports, places the facility in an allowable location that minimizes the utilitarian social cost — the sum of agents costs. A mechanism is strategyproof (SP) if no agent may misreport its locations and be better off; it is group-strategyproof (GSP) if no coalition of agents benefits by jointly misreporting their locations The requirement for (G)SP in this setting makes optimum placement of the facility impossible and, therefore, we consider approximation (G)SP mechanisms. For SP mechanisms, we give a simple 3-approximation randomized mechanism and also provide asymptotic lower bounds for different variants. For GSP mechanisms, a (2N + 1)-approximation deterministic GSP mechanism is devised. Although the mechanism is simple, we showed that it is asymptotically optimal up to a constant. Our Ω(N 1 − ε ) lower bound that randomization cannot improve over the approximation factor achieved by the deterministic mechanism, when GSP is required.en
dc.identifier.citationpages531-538en
dc.relation.ispartofseriestitleLecture Notes in Computer Scienceen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesnumber6484en
dc.relation.ispartoftitleInternet and Network Economics 6th International Workshop, WINE 2010, Stanford, CA, USA, December 13-17, 2010, Proceedingsen
dc.relation.ispartofeditorSaberi, Amin
dc.relation.ispartofpublnameSpringeren
dc.relation.ispartofpublcityBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofdate2010
dc.relation.ispartofpages580en
dc.relation.ispartofurlhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5en
dc.subject.ddclabelProgrammation, logiciels, organisation des donnéesen
dc.relation.ispartofisbn978-3-642-17571-8en
dc.relation.conftitle6th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2010en
dc.relation.confdate2010-12
dc.relation.confcityStanforden
dc.relation.confcountryÉtats-Unisen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_47en


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