Multistage communication with and without verifiable types
Koessler, Frédéric; Forges, Françoise (2008), Multistage communication with and without verifiable types, International Game Theory Review, 10, 2, p. 145-164. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S0219198908001844
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publiéDate
2008Journal name
International Game Theory ReviewVolume
10Number
2Publisher
World Scientific
Pages
145-164
Publication identifier
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract (EN)
We survey selected results on strategic information transmission. We distinguish between "cheap talk" and "persuasion". In the latter model, the informed player's message set depends on his type. As a benchmark, we first assume that the informed player sends a single message to the decision maker. We state characterization results for the sets of equilibrium payoffs, with and without verifiable types. We then show that multistage, bilateral communication enables the players to achieve new equilibrium outcomes, even if types are verifiable. We also propose complete characterizations of the equilibrium payoffs that are achievable with a bounded number of communication rounds.Subjects / Keywords
Cheap talk; Certification; Incomplete information; Verifiable types; Jointly controlled lotteries; Information transmissionRelated items
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