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Multistage communication with and without verifiable types

Koessler, Frédéric; Forges, Françoise (2008), Multistage communication with and without verifiable types, International Game Theory Review, 10, 2, p. 145-164. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S0219198908001844

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2008
Journal name
International Game Theory Review
Volume
10
Number
2
Publisher
World Scientific
Pages
145-164
Publication identifier
http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S0219198908001844
Metadata
Show full item record
Author(s)
Koessler, Frédéric cc
Forges, Françoise
Abstract (EN)
We survey selected results on strategic information transmission. We distinguish between "cheap talk" and "persuasion". In the latter model, the informed player's message set depends on his type. As a benchmark, we first assume that the informed player sends a single message to the decision maker. We state characterization results for the sets of equilibrium payoffs, with and without verifiable types. We then show that multistage, bilateral communication enables the players to achieve new equilibrium outcomes, even if types are verifiable. We also propose complete characterizations of the equilibrium payoffs that are achievable with a bounded number of communication rounds.
Subjects / Keywords
Cheap talk; Certification; Incomplete information; Verifiable types; Jointly controlled lotteries; Information transmission
JEL
C72 - Noncooperative Games
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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