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dc.contributor.authorViossat, Yannick
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-15T08:42:57Z
dc.date.available2009-07-15T08:42:57Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/1119
dc.descriptionLe fichier accessible ci-dessous est une version également éditée dans les Cahiers de la Chaire "Les Particuliers face aux Risques" de l'Institut de Finance de Dauphine, cahier n° 24, août 2008
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectCorrelated equilibrium; Evolutionary dynamics; Elimination; As-if rationalityen
dc.subject.ddc519en
dc.subject.classificationjelC73en
dc.subject.classificationjelC72en
dc.titleEvolutionary Dynamics May Eliminate All Strategies Used in Correlated Equilibriaen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenWe show on a 4x4 example that many dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibria, and this for an open set of games. This holds for the best-response dynamics, the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics and any monotonic or weakly sign-preserving dynamics satisfying some standard regularity conditions. For the replicator dynamics and the best-response dynamics, elimination of all strategies used in correlated equilibrium is shown to be robust to the addition of mixed strategies as new pure strategies.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameMathematical Social Sciences
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol56en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue1en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2008-07
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages27-43en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.12.001en
dc.identifier.urlsitehttp://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00360756/en/en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevier B.V.en
dc.subject.ddclabelProbabilités et mathématiques appliquéesen


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