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Towards a Theory of Deception

dc.contributor.authorJehiel, Philippe
dc.contributor.authorEttinger, David
dc.date.accessioned2013-04-04T11:32:26Z
dc.date.available2013-04-04T11:32:26Z
dc.date.issued2007-07
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/11188
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectDeceptionen
dc.subjectGame theoryen
dc.subjectFundamental attribution erroren
dc.subject.ddc338.5en
dc.subject.classificationjelC72en
dc.subject.classificationjelD81en
dc.titleTowards a Theory of Deceptionen
dc.typeDocument de travail / Working paper
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherUniversité de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA,;France
dc.description.abstractenThis paper proposes an equilibrium approach to belief manipulation and deception in which agents only have coarse knowledge of their opponent s strategy. Equilibrium requires the coarse knowledge available to agents to be correct, and the inferences and optimizations to be made on the basis of the simplest theories compatible with the available knowledge. The approach can be viewed as formalizing into a game theoretic setting a well documented bias in social psychology, the Fundamental Attribution Error. It is applied to a bargaining problem, thereby revealing a deceptive tactic that is hard to explain in the full rationality paradigm.en
dc.publisher.nameUCLA Department of Economicen
dc.publisher.cityLos Angelesen
dc.identifier.citationpages27en
dc.relation.ispartofseriestitleLevine's Bibliographyen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesnumber843644000000000126en
dc.subject.ddclabelMicroéconomieen
dc.description.submittednonen


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