
Towards a Theory of Deception
Jehiel, Philippe; Ettinger, David (2007-07), Towards a Theory of Deception. https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/11188
Voir/Ouvrir
Type
Document de travail / Working paperDate
2007-07Éditeur
UCLA Department of Economic
Titre de la collection
Levine's BibliographyNuméro dans la collection
843644000000000126Ville d’édition
Los Angeles
Pages
27
Métadonnées
Afficher la notice complèteRésumé (EN)
This paper proposes an equilibrium approach to belief manipulation and deception in which agents only have coarse knowledge of their opponent s strategy. Equilibrium requires the coarse knowledge available to agents to be correct, and the inferences and optimizations to be made on the basis of the simplest theories compatible with the available knowledge. The approach can be viewed as formalizing into a game theoretic setting a well documented bias in social psychology, the Fundamental Attribution Error. It is applied to a bargaining problem, thereby revealing a deceptive tactic that is hard to explain in the full rationality paradigm.Mots-clés
Deception; Game theory; Fundamental attribution errorPublications associées
Affichage des éléments liés par titre et auteur.
-
Jehiel, Philippe; Ettinger, David (2010) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
-
Ettinger, David; Jehiel, P. (2021) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
-
Biancini, Sara; Ettinger, David; Venet, Baptiste (2018) Document de travail / Working paper
-
Dragicevic, Arnaud; Ettinger, David (2011) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
-
Gavignet, Eric; Rigaux, Philippe; Faget, Zoe; Davy-Rigaux, Cécile; Lee, H.; Gross-Amblard, David; Cullot, Nadine; Audéon, H.; Abrouk, Lylia; Thion-Goasdoué, Virginie; Tacaille, Alice (2009) Communication / Conférence