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Two-Sided Matching with One-Sided Preferences

dc.contributor.authorHaeringer, Guillaume
dc.contributor.authorIehlé, Vincent
HAL ID: 173620
ORCID: 0000-0001-6086-6832
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-07T13:08:30Z
dc.date.available2013-03-07T13:08:30Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/11092
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectSchool Choice
dc.subjectHall’s marriage theorem
dc.subjectPareto improvement
dc.subjectstable matching
dc.subject.ddc338.5en
dc.subject.classificationjelC72en
dc.subject.classificationjelD41en
dc.titleTwo-Sided Matching with One-Sided Preferences
dc.typeDocument de travail / Working paper
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherUniversitat Autonoma de Barcelona;;Espagne
dc.description.abstractenA stylized fact of most centralized matching markets (for example school choiceproblems is that participants tend to submit preference lists over a small number ofpotential matches. This paper is based on the premise that this fact provides additionalinformation that can be used to match agents. In a school choice context we showthat considering only schools’ priorities and the set of acceptable schools for each student (but not their submitted preferences), we can restrict the set of possible stable matchings that can arise for any preference profile of the students that leaves the setof acceptable schools unchanged. Our approach consists of linking Hall’s marriage condition to stable matchings and offers a methodology that can be used for data analysis when one has access to the preferences of only one side of the market. We use our technique to propose a new mechanism for school choice problems that Pareto dominates the Student Optimal Stable Mechanism, and show that in this mechanism it is a dominant strategy to always rank the schools that have been revealed as acceptablein the same order as in the true preferences.
dc.publisher.cityParisen
dc.identifier.citationpages34
dc.relation.ispartofseriestitleUniversité Paris Dauphine
dc.identifier.urlsitehttps://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00980794
dc.subject.ddclabelMicroéconomieen
dc.description.submittednonen
dc.description.ssrncandidatenon
dc.description.halcandidateoui
dc.description.readershiprecherche
dc.description.audienceInternational
dc.date.updated2017-09-13T14:19:05Z


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