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dc.contributor.authorForges, Françoise
dc.date.accessioned2013-02-26T09:31:54Z
dc.date.available2013-02-26T09:31:54Z
dc.date.issued2013-03
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/11052
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectBayesian gameen
dc.subjectcommitmenten
dc.subjectcontracten
dc.subjectincentive compatibilityen
dc.subjectinterim individual rationalityen
dc.subject.ddc332en
dc.subject.classificationjelC70en
dc.titleA folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitmenten
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenThe set of all Bayesian–Nash equilibrium payoffs that the players can achieve by making conditional commitments at the interim stage of a Bayesian game coincides with the set of all feasible, incentive compatible and interim individually rational payoffs of the Bayesian game. Furthermore, the various equilibrium payoffs, which are achieved by means of different commitment devices, are also the equilibrium payoffs of a universal, deterministic commitment game.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameGames and Economic Behavior
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol78en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue1en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2013-03
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages64-71en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.11.004en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie financièreen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.relation.forthcomingprintnonen


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