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A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment

Forges, Françoise (2013), A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment, Games and Economic Behavior, 78, 1, p. 64-71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.11.004

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2013-03
Journal name
Games and Economic Behavior
Volume
78
Number
1
Publisher
Elsevier
Pages
64-71
Publication identifier
Metadata
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Author(s)
Forges, Françoise
Abstract (EN)
The set of all Bayesian–Nash equilibrium payoffs that the players can achieve by making conditional commitments at the interim stage of a Bayesian game coincides with the set of all feasible, incentive compatible and interim individually rational payoffs of the Bayesian game. Furthermore, the various equilibrium payoffs, which are achieved by means of different commitment devices, are also the equilibrium payoffs of a universal, deterministic commitment game.
Subjects / Keywords
Bayesian game; commitment; contract; incentive compatibility; interim individual rationality
JEL
C70 - General