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Sovereignty without Borders: On Individual Rights, the Delegation to Rule, and Globalization

Brousseau, Eric; Sgard, Jérôme; Schemeil, Yves (2011), Sovereignty without Borders: On Individual Rights, the Delegation to Rule, and Globalization. https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/10770

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RSCAS_2011_28.rev.pdf (145.3Kb)
Type
Document de travail / Working paper
Date
2011
Publisher
European University Institute
Series title
EUI Working Papers, RSCAS, Global Governance Programme-05
Series number
2011/28
Published in
San Domenico di Fiesole
Pages
31
Metadata
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Author(s)
Brousseau, Eric
Sgard, Jérôme
Schemeil, Yves
Abstract (EN)
Just as medieval municipal republics surrendered to national sovereigns in the past, incumbent states may be replaced in the future by an alternate, global public order. Citizens and merchants would obtain more equal rights, better market infrastructures, and a more efficient provision of public goods at all levels of government, from the local to the global. This proposition is supported by an agentbased, incentive-compatible model where individual rights—economic and political—are established within an ongoing bargain with rulers. Enfranchisement then shapes the autonomous dynamics of civil society and markets and, over time, allows for feedback of preferences into the core bargain on rights. Globalization results from a capacity to trade and associate that extends far beyond home jurisdictions, yet on the basis of differentiated franchises. In this representation, the world is anarchic, pluralistic, unequal, and growing. Although it is no longer state-centered, long-term change is driven by the attempts and failures of states to establish a more coherent normative infrastructure and to respond to new social demands. From this account, we derive four scenarios of global reordering, among which maximal integration would see the classical nation-state split into two parts: a decentralized, federal structure of government; and a unified legal order that would warrant equal rights and generalized open access throughout the world.
Subjects / Keywords
Constitutional Rights; Economic dynamics; Vertical bargaining; state; global reordering; Legal order; public bureaucracies
JEL
F18 - Trade and Environment
F02 - International Economic Order and Integration
K00 - General

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