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dc.contributor.authorViossat, Yannick
dc.date.accessioned2012-11-23T14:47:37Z
dc.date.available2012-11-23T14:47:37Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/10630
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectbest-reply dynamicsen
dc.subjectreplicator dynamicsen
dc.subjectNash equilibriumen
dc.subject.ddc519en
dc.subject.classificationjelC73en
dc.subject.classificationjelC7en
dc.titleGame Dynamics and Nash Equilibriaen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenIf a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the solution of the game from the refinement's literature point of view. However, it might be that for almost all initial conditions, all strategies in the support of this equilibrium are eliminated by the replicator dynamics and the best-reply dynamics.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameJournal of Dynamics and Games
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol1
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue3
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2014
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2014
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages537-553
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2014.1.537
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherAIMS
dc.subject.ddclabelProbabilités et mathématiques appliquéesen
dc.description.submittednonen


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