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Game Dynamics and Nash Equilibria

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Date
2014
Dewey
Probabilités et mathématiques appliquées
Sujet
best-reply dynamics; replicator dynamics; Nash equilibrium
JEL code
C73; C7
Journal issue
Journal of Dynamics and Games
Volume
1
Number
3
Publication date
2014
Article pages
537-553
Publisher
AIMS
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2014.1.537
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/10630
Collections
  • CEREMADE : Publications
Metadata
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Author
Viossat, Yannick
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the solution of the game from the refinement's literature point of view. However, it might be that for almost all initial conditions, all strategies in the support of this equilibrium are eliminated by the replicator dynamics and the best-reply dynamics.

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