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dc.contributor.authorViossat, Yannick
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-10T10:37:24Z
dc.date.available2009-07-10T10:37:24Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/1061
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectThéorie des jeuxen
dc.subject.ddc519en
dc.subject.classificationjelC73en
dc.titleThe Replicator Dynamics Does not Lead to Correlated Equilibriaen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenIt is shown that, under the replicator dynamics, all strategies played in correlated equilibrium may be eliminated, so that only strategies with zero marginal probability in all correlated equilibria survive. This occurs in particular in a family of 4×4 games built by adding a strategy to a Rock-Paper-Scissors game.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameGames and Economic Behavior
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol59en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue2en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2007-05
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages397-407en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.001en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelProbabilités et mathématiques appliquéesen


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