Author
Tercieux, Olivier
Oury, Marion
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
It is well-known that mechanism design literature makes many simplifying infor-
mational assumptions in particular in terms of common knowledge of the environment
among players. In this paper, we introduce a notion of continuous implementation and
characterize when a social choice function is continuously implementable. More specif-
ically, we say that a social choice function is continuously (partially) implementable
if it is (partially) implementable for types in the model under study and it continues
to be (partially) implementable for types "close" to this initial model. We rst show
that if the model is of complete information a social choice function is continuously
(partially) implementable only if it satis es Maskin s monotonicity. We then extend
this result to general incomplete information settings and show that a social choice
function is continuously (partially) implementable only if it is fully implementable in
iterative dominance. For nite mechanisms, this condition is also su¢ cient. We also
discuss implications of this characterization for the virtual implementation approach.