Abstract

History, like economy is and should be « in debate » because the reality is and will always be, in human societies, a conflicting one, with – like Walter Benjamin states - non linear evolution, with several « possibles » and historical bifurcations. The dominant analysis, in different periods and contexts, are full of « holes » suppressing alternatives and the non recognized memories. Historians like economists are not « neutral », they select facts. But they should make explicit their choices and criteria, and be « non aligned ».

I tried to hold such a position in the research on Yugoslavia, during the Cold War – under the condition of resistance to « campism » - which meant a consistent « non alignment », with explicit criteria...

After the fall of the Berlin Wall new kinds of official history and « autistic economy » tends to emerge – that I interpret as a more obscure form of new « Cold War ». More than ever historians and economists cannot be « neutral » but should be non-aligned and resisting to « one and unique (official) thought ».

I will first make explicit the way I implemented my non-alignment under the first Cold War, in my study on the Titoit regime and economic reforms. Than I will give examples of that new Cold War and of resistances to it in both fields of my own research crossing history and economics.

During the Cold War and bipolar world, „campism“ was a pressure from the two dominant Great Powers to submitt their respective citizens to a witch hunting when they made internal criticisms of the „camp“ where they lived in ; each one had to chose „its camp“, hiding the reality of that camp's internal failures and oppressive realities.

But neither United States nor the Stalinised Soviet Union could control the reality of political and social resistances to their respective rule. The Non Aligned movement – with the specific role played by the Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito within it – was an heterogenous resistance to that, without being able to present an alternative consistent set of answers on political and socio-economical stakes. But it helped resisting to hegemonical thinking and acting.
History, like economy is and should be « in debate »¹ because the reality is and will stay (hopefully...) a conflicting one, with – like Walter Benjamin states - non linear evolution, several « possibles » and historical bifurcations. The dominant tendency, in different periods and contexts, has been an history full of « holes » suppressing alternatives and the non recognized memories².

I tried to resist „campism“ - which meant a consistent « non alignment », including... independance from the Titoist regime in the analysis of its own conflicts and contradictions. I did it with explicit criteria... I will begin with that, before analysing the conditions (and resistance needed to) of a new Cold War...

Non neutrality, but non alignment in the analysis of the Yugoslav Titoist experience...

I certainly was not „neutral“ in dealing with the Yugoslav experience. Any analysis implies a selection of facts, which in itself, is never „neutral“. Which one ? With what criteria ?

My criteria and emphasis were put on resistances to any kind of relations of domination. I had and still have a subjective marxist conviction : that emancipation of humanbeing is needed and possible to get rid of human „prehistory“ and classes. That is presisely why I was interested in the Yugoslav revolution, its conflicts with Stalin and the introduction of „selfmanagement“ ...

As I said explicitely in my thesis on the Yugoslav experience, I kept and I am still convinced of the need to keep and implement from marxism :

1) an historical approach of human societies and systems – and I did include in such an approach the systems claiming to be socialists which had to be analysed in their world historical context, evolution, crisis...

2) an analysis going „behind“ and „beyong“ ideological speeches, economic categories and institutions (prices, costs, demand, money, market, state) to stress hidden social relationships of domination and alienation. And I did inclued, again, in such analysis, systems claiming to be socialists but having still classes, social differentiations, relations of domination, with specific bureaucratic cristalisation linked with the single party sytem, first of all, with international consequences, the stalinisation of the Soviet Union...

Any analysis of the socialist regimes were confronted with the interpretation of stalinisation. Both for radical anti-communist currents and for Stalin's power and supporters, Soviet Union was socialist... The dominant interpretations given later on within the Communist parties, was that of a deformation – Khrouchtchev's rehabilitation of the Yugoslav communists in 1955 and its report in the XXth Congress of the CPSU in 1956, was supposed to make an end to those fundamental distorsions. A part of the non mainstream marxists (refering to Trotsky) considered Soviet Union (with different criteria I don't want to discuss here) either as state capitalism or a new class system³ – and the Yugoslav variant was integrated within a stalinist world-system ; or a „non event“, still

¹Several groups of researchers have put recently more emphasis on that approach, specially focused on „warm issues“ of past or „immediate“ history : see http://www.h-debate.com/ (Historia A Debate – History under debate – l'Histoire en débat) , in Spain ; or in France Group of research on Immediate History – University Toulouse2 : http://w3.univ-tlse2.fr/grhi/index.htm.

²Read Michael Lowy's about Walter Benjamin's concept of History (« avertissement d'incendie, une lecture des thèses sur le concept d'histoire »), PUF, "Pratiques théoriques", 2001. Read also his article "le point de vue des vaincus dans l'histoire de l'Amérique latine : réflexions méthodologiques à partir de Walter Benjamin" (the point of view of defeated people in the history of Latin America : methodological reflexions based on Walter Benjamin) on http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article5634.

³That became also Milovan Djilas's view, for which he was put in jail... The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System, paperback, San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1957.
within the capitalist one.

I shared and developed another view combining different aspects: Stalinisation was considered as a kind of counterrevolution within the revolution, but without neither capitalist restauration nor a stabilisation of the bureaucracy as a consistent independent class. Degrees of bureaucratisation could occur in all social and workers organisations that had to be consciently opposed. The accent on self organisation and democracy was to be more radical, both in political organisations, associations, and society. I put emphasis on unstable characteristic of the Yugoslav bureaucratisation, with social polarisation in the framework of market reforms in the 1960s. In spite of the forbidding of public criticism to the Soviet Union, I analysed the conflicts between the Yugoslav Titoist leaders and Stalin before, during and after the Second world war – the deepness and limits of those conflicts could appear in „turning points“ like 1956 and 1968. But historical proofs about the reality of a large and deep Yugoslav revolution were convincing.

The Partisan's movement and the revolutionary process were resisting to Yalta's kind of „order“ - a division of the world between Great Powers around a table, behind the back of the populations concerned. In that „distribution“ the Yugoslav regime was supposed to be at 50/50 under both influence. That meant the return of the King from its exile in London, and some communist seats in the Parliament – instead of repression and clandestinity as in the first Yugoslavia... The AVNOJ conference in 1943 was a clearcut answer to that „decision“ - with its statement against the return of the Monarchy. It was a concretisation of a resistance to the Allies's policy, possible because of a broad popular legitimacy of the future new federal Yugoslavia and a relationship of forces on the ground...

The roots of the later „excommunication“ of the Yugoslav regime by the Kremlin in 1948 were twofolds: on one side, the Soviet Union was and behaved as a „Great Power“ attempting to impose its hegemony on the world communist movement, and more broadly on social and national struggles of liberation. The repression of supposed „Titoist“ leaders within the Hungarian, Czech and Polish parties between 1948 and 1953 and the liquidation of the Greek resistance (in a country that Yalta put on the Western side...) were indications of repressive attempts to control the regional dynamics, on both sides.

In my recent research, I found important to discuss why it had been possible to build a new Yugoslavia under the leadership of the Yugoslav communist party in conditions of Great Power's initial opposition, after the failure of the first Yugoslavia, and in the context of the bloody conflicts of the civil war, with quite a small Communist Party just before the war (because of repression and internal divisions)? The possibility to build a unity against a foreign invader, and concrete ideological and material basis for the Partisan's victory were to be stressed: the recognition of a multi-national reality, and social measures like the distribution of lands and suppression of debts for impoverished people involved in the armed struggle.

In spite of the fact that open criticisms to Soviet Union were forbidden up to 1948, and even repressed as „troskyte“, the Yugoslav communist radical way of organizing antifascist struggle didnot fit with Stalin's interests and choices. And it was again conflicting with the kind of economic

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and political subordination that the Kremlin wanted to impose after the war to its „brother countries“.

But the split with Stalin in 1948 was not the end of the single party system; neither of Yugoslav/Soviet relationships and tensions.

I understood the move of the Yugoslav communist leaders in 1950 as a way to use Marx (and emancipatory aims of the Marxist approach) against Stalin within the international communist movement; and, more concretely for the immediate Yugoslav society, as an attempt to consolidate and mobilise the socio-economical and intellectual basis of the regime in order to resist Stalin’s rules (and imperialist pressures behind the „aid“ to a dissidence...).

But in that first phase the central plan, inspite of its transformation, was conflicting with two aspirations: from republics looking for more sovereignty (and richest republics for less redistribution); and from selfmanagement looking for more rights.

I consider selfmanagement as an ideal not a concrete system. And there was and still is no „model“ to confront the Yugoslav experience to. Neither was the Yugoslav set of institutions a „model“. I tried therefore to make an historical and concrete analysis of the reforms (and different sets of institutions) introduced in three decades in their international and national contexts, looking for the conflicts, desequilibrium and political pressures explaining the institutional changes at each stage.

I understood the market reforms in 1965 as a form of answer – under the predominance of economist advisers more than political leaders - to the two levels of conflicts stressed above (between redistributive planning and the richest republics; and between central organs of planning and selfmanagement organs). But the reform raised rapidly new conflicts: pressure for equalitarian statute of each nationality (Albanian narodnosti and not only Slav narodi...) but also for increasing confederalisation on the point of view of the richest republics; and at the same time, resistances to market inequalities and effects, vertical and horizontal stratifications, including the autonomisation of the new financial system...

The last Constitution of 1974 is a kind of synthesis of that regime, both its innovative capacities and contradictions. It is, again, to be read in the context of the conflicts and events which occured between 1968 and 1972.

In the analysis of that new turn, I took in account, two sets of elements.

First, around the stake of social ownership linked with the practice of the different reforms and conflicts already stressed, and with the theoretical debates and elaboration occuring on this issue. The new laws about „associated labour“ and selfmanagement planning reflected a new historical phase in the concept and practice of ownership, protecting it from the two others: state management (and central planning) or factory management (and market regulation). In the new Constitution, social ownership belonged neither to the state not to the factory collectives. That very point

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7 Edvard Kardelj has been the father of institutional transformation of the constituion, and, as the official theoritician of the regime was of course important to study (cf. E. Kardelj Les contradictions de la propriété sociale dans le système socialiste, Editions Anthropolis, 1976). That could be confronted to analysis and critical approaches on that topics produced by well known Yugoslav philosophers and economists, specially around the Praxis review, organizing international conferences in Korcula during the sixties up to the final repression of those activities at the end of that decade.
happened to be a legal difficulty of the further phase of privatisation in the 1990's... But, I also analysed the Constitution, in the context and field of its political (fragile) equilibrium and compromise between centralisation and decentralisation; or, between the Yugoslav leadership (Tito and Kardelj, as main „arbiters and central repressive power) and different movements which occurred in the period 1965-1972. I always found necessary to stress the dual aspect of the Titoist regime: that combination of repression of independant movements and concessions (new rights) to their demands – under the „leading role of the party“. The 1974 Constitution reaffirm that role, and added a specific increase of the army's representation... Opposing trends characterized the anti-market intellectual, and social movements of 1968, on one hand and the Croatian demand of decentralised control of foreign exchange in 1971, on the other. The Constitution combined concessions to both... Similar combinations could again be found about the Kosovo statute: repression of demonstrations asking for a republic; and a new (highly ambiguous) statute as a quasi-republic in the new Constitution.

This combination of repression of all independant movements inspite of concessions to them did not permit to offer a consistent system and an alternative to the organic bureaucratisation and final crisis of all single party's regimes. It did not offer a political and institutional democratic framework to maintain solidarity among the actors of the system and deal with the economic crisis at the federal level. But the external factors (endebtment in foreign exchange and external institutional pressure to „solve“ it along neo-liberal recepees) increased, instead of reducing, the crisis.

*From the former Cold War to the new one*

Unfortunately, after the end of the single party systems in power in Eastern and South Estern Europe, a new kind of intellectual and political pressures has developed. Instead of the official end of the Cold War, I will interpret it as its continuation in a different context, against a wellknown „ghost“...

The causes of the end of those systems are internal/external. As far as endogenous factors are concerned, desequilibrium, wastes and unsatisfactions can very easily be interpreted as due to a lack of democratic pluralist controls on collective ownership, not enough responsibility of all human beings, with individual and collective rights and freedoms within their work and daily life; no collective and pluralist capacity of consistent decision making on socio-economic issues; no organised debates on balancesheets of experiences, on wastes; no elaboration of criteria of evaluation of those wastes according to human and ecological criteria; no democratic procedures on priorities and aims, criteria of income distribution, permitting then to discuss on means (different forms of ownerships, planned priorities, socialized market, forms of democracy...); no debates on adequate levels of decision making in order to better satisfy needs... But... All those potentials are much closer to real socialist ideals than to real existing capitalism going back to XIXth century with NATO expansion instead of „modernity“ and end of Cold War...

Single parties in power prevented such discussions – and many of their members turned toward privatisation for themselves... But the first NATO war of all its history has been launched, without respecting United Nation Charter, on the Kosovo issue... in a context where the cold war was

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9 My analysis of the causes and mechanism of desintegration of the Yugoslav fédération and social system during the years 1991-2006 have been published under the title « Yougoslavie : de la désintégration à l'Europe » Editions du Cygne, 2008.
supposed to be finished...

My interpretation is that it had nothing to do with respecting „selfdetermination“, rights or lives. But there were lots of „holes“ behind that story:
- on the internal scenarios and history of the Yugoslav desintegration (and on that issue I shared none of the dominant views on the Milosevic regime who was, on my point of view neither Hitler, nor a continuation of a left oriented anti-capitalist and Titoist regime – and I put emphasis on similarities and conflicting alliances between Milosevic and Tudjman regimes);
- and on international issues, several geostrategical goals behind the way of „dealing with“ the Kosovo issue (trying to „build“ the UE – with obvious difficulties for European diplomacies; and – for United States – redefining NATO and involving European construction within an atlantic order). I tried to put forward the „holes“ of international policy behind the „holes“ of the International Tribunal on ex-Yugoslavia, after the death of Slobodan Milosevic – this is a matter of real pluralistic debates. Such a debate is, for the moment, simply impossible because the responsibilities of Great Powers behind the crimes committed in Srebrenica and Krajina, and in the dealing of the Kosovo issue, are immense...

An ideological stake has therefore been combined with the „systemic transformations“ within the new phase of globalisation: trends to rebuild a „linear“ History, without criticism of Western policies. But also, more broadly, getting rid of any legitimation of past and present resistance to the capitalist world-system, and any trace of real socialist aspirations: that is a kind of very obscure and multiform Cold War against old „ghost“, but real attempts to destroy collective re-thinking of past and present, and with a teological „transition towards market economy“ - which was the „official“ presentation of „experts“ and international institutions of the ongoing transformation in Eastern Europe. „Transition“ from... to.... The goal was supposed to be clear. At least it was established. By whom?

The different economic schools which gave at the turn of the 1980s the theoretical background of the co-called „liberal“ (better qualified as neo-conservative) world order have universal pretention: they are supposed to interpret and give answer to all kinds of crisis occurring in the second half of the XXth century – all being due to „too much“ interventions of states. In fact the real stake is not the state, but any kind of social state. Since the slow down of growth in the 1970s in the core countries, linked with a crisis of productivity and profit (hidden behind what was called „stagflation“) state interventions have not been suppressed. States have been used to impose market regulations and destroy social protections - from Pinochet in Chili to Reagan or Margaret Thatcher in the core countries. Behind strong states interventions there was a Cold War between wages considered as „costs“ to be reduced and wages considered as the income of human beings; a Cold War between forced and general privatisation against any social (public, collective) property rights ...

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10 This analysis has been published in the book quoted in note 9. A translation in English can be found, as « dossier on Milosevic » in the website of the review International ViewPoint, in August 2006.

11 Different schools refered to as « Supply siders », « Public choice », « Property rights », and « Monetarists » specialized on different issues (with conflicting view on money between Monetarists and the others); but they have in common to criticize all openings to state regulations within the capitalist countries themselves when specific issues had been analysed as « failures of the market », and specially the Keynesian approach supporting public politicies to sustain, against market cycles and private logics, growth, full employment and welfare states. All those schools don‘t accept such « failures » or consider state intervention as worse, in any case. A broad part of these theories is in the continuation of the Austrian Hayek’s school of the end of the XIXth, beginning of XXth century. Hayek himself, confronted to fascism and stalinism considered state intervention as the very cause of those evils, radicalizing the pro-market view of his successors.
Samary - Yugoslav history in the Cold Wars.

Like in the XIXth century, the so-called „free trade“ presented by dominant core countries as equalitarian and beneficial for all, was destroying protections in the semiperiphery of the capitalist world-system; and its expansion (like in the XIXth century) was an answer to a crisis of profitability in the core countries, combined with a reorganisation of the world order. But unlike the XIXth century, there is no more the possibility and the necessity of open colonisation: „preventive wars“ and sending foreign troops in order to „impose democracy“, extensive rights for NATO to have its basis along all strategical coasts and „corridors“ for petrol and oil, are good enough.

The Yugoslav crisis played a specific and not foreseen role in that reorganisation: as the Warsaw Pact dissolved in 1991, NATO could also disappear. The concept of European construction which could be open to different options, was channeled into narrow monetarist (Maastricht Treaty) and Atlantist (through Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts) features.

... and towards new official Histories

After the end of the single party system, the thesis of the „end of History“ could be considered as a blind or naive view. It was rapidly abandoned for the new paradigm: the „clash of civilisations“. After the former communist enemy a new one could justify the new armace. But, in spite of the „use“ of islamophobia and war against terrorism for specific „civilized wars“, the Islamic world is as heterogeneous as the Western one; ethnicisation of politics will not work so long neither. The demand to subordinate socio-economic choices to sovereign political democratic choices is/will become more and more, at the world level, the real stake. That has to be prevented to protect the new world order from … the old ghost.

Whatever be the ideological variants presenting the new historical phase after the fall of the Berlin Wall, they go hand by hand with a trend to re-write History in a „linear“ and Western-centric way and of suppressing socio-economic choices from the field of politics. There is obviously, not an identical stable situation everywhere. Issues are confused like words and etiquets...

Stalinism and dictatorships of single party systems have, of course introduced „official“ histories, hiding failures, oppressions and crimes. Behind the „marxist“ etiquette, there has been censorship on criticisms of the system, and voluntarily distorted views and lies on its opponents. The researchers who accepted such rules were not „neutral“. But that was not the problem: they were not free and independant from the political power. That was/is the issue.

But this is obviously not only an issue of the communist regimes or of dictatorships of different kinds. It is a present issue in the supposed civilized and democratic modern world order and regimes when your research deals with „warm“ issues where existing powers are still involved, in a way or another. In order to put one's own house in order, I will mention a big scandal and controversies which occured recently in France, about a Law, voted on February 25th, 2005 by the Parliament. Its Article 4 gave an „official“ line on the colonial past as having had „positive“ sides... That meant that any other view for research and teaching would have been „out of law“... Protests were so important, from anticolonial currents, from ex-colonies like Algeria and from historians, that

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12 I completely share Jozsef Börösz's contribution « Whitened Histories, Global colours) dealing with that important issue in that conference.

13 It must be said that the Algerian war – with several hundreds of thousands of victims was recognized as „war“ (and no more as „Algerian events“ as it was said officially) by the French Parliament only in 1998 under Jacques Chirac's presidency; with no official recognition of the torture which, according to Pierre Vidal Naquet, a great French Historian
Article 4 have been withdrawn\textsuperscript{14}. But a broader debate has developed around the trend to introduce Laws\textsuperscript{15} on history, against the risk of „official history“ and instrumentalisation of history by political powers. A „Comité de vigilance face aux usages publics de l’histoire“ (Committee to watch public use of History)\textsuperscript{16} was established recently by historians among whom Claude Liauzu, who recently died and was one of the most well-known historians on colonisation who denounced in French medias the February 2005 Law.

But let us look at other official presentation of past history and recent trends in Europe : what did/do mean claiming that after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Eastern European people have to „come back to Europe“ ? Or that there is a „reunification of the continent“ - what viewpoint is there behind such a vocabulary ? What historical truth is that ? The vocabulary covers a set of reductions :

a) „Europe“ being identified with its Western side (like United States became „America“?) : nothing worth being „European“ from others - uneventment of Yugoslav’s and Eastern Europe’s history ? But also legitimisation of that construction in its Western side too, as if it was „obvious“, without questionnings and conflicts. The French „no“ to the Constitution has probably been presented in the world, like in the dominant medias in France, as „anti-European“, or „nationalist“ and rightist. Without telling that, if it is of course true that there was a LePen, rightist and nationalist „no“, the dominant votes were „for another Europe“, with social and democratic priorities, with a consistent opening to South and Eastern Countries, on equal footing, for a collective construction. The conditions of „enlargment“ were criticized, not enlargment as such. Those who defended another Europe were in favor of an enlarged budget, against monetarist criteria, against the trends to privatize public services and establish general competition for minimum wages... For a social convergence towards the highest social standards, through democratic procedures...

b) Not only are the European Union’s institutions and economic criteria et debates hidden behind „Europe“ but also past European conflicts and divisions are ignored : if we have a „re-unified Europe“, it means it was once (before „communism“ ?) unified ?

What about wars between European empires, and between dominant powers in competition to control the planet ? What about financial and trade relations producing increasing gaps between the „core countries“ of European capitalist world-system and semi-peripherical ones ? What about fascism and nazi politics in Western „civilized“ European countries ?

What about the reason of the Yugoslav revolution ? An artificial break with a „unified Europe“ ? A bloody totalitarian communist led revolution ? Violence, to be put on the same basket as fascist – oustachi – violence ? And should there be, every where, like Franjo Tudjman proposed for the Jacenovac Memorial, addition of „victims of communism“ to „victims of fascism“ ?

The issue is becoming very warm and worrying in Italy – with possible important links with similar debates in Croatia and Slovenia. The historian Stéfanie Prezioso from the Lausanne University has produced a consistent analysis of the way the Italian resistance is in the center of a very intense historiographical and political debate\textsuperscript{17}. The war of resistance which occured between 1943 and

\textsuperscript{14} For informations on controversies and petitions around that issue, look at the website against the article 4 of the Law of February 25\textsuperscript{th}, 2005 : http://clioweb.free.fr/dossiers/colonisation/petitions.htm

\textsuperscript{15} In 1990 was voted a Law Gayssot (the name of the Minister who introduced it) against any discrimination based on origins, ethnicity, religion... but with a specific article 9 which forbids any denial of the reality of crimes against humanity, as defined at Nuremberg International Tribunal – about the nazi holocauste. Since then, several proposals of laws have been made, in order to extend the Gayssot Law to the denial of the Armenian genocide, or to all genocides. A law recognizing slavery as a crime against humanity has been voted.

\textsuperscript{16} http://cvuh.free.fr is the website of that Committe.

\textsuperscript{17} The article published in 2006 can be found on http://www.univ-brest.fr/ammis, the website of the Revue Amnis
1945 is the core of the controversy. More precisely, up to a recent period, controversies existed about the content and characterisation of that resistance (national liberation, civil war, class struggle?) – but „this politisation was a kind of guarantee” of the integration of the resistance – with different dimensions - in the Italian history. The increasing influence of Silvio Berlusconi and its allies on the Italian political scene in the recent years has opened a new trend, in the context of political de/recomposition of the ex-communists: „for the center-right forces, the matter is no more to criticize the different interpretations and studies done on the different aspects of the Resistance; it is the very existence of the resistance which must be eliminate” 18. The place and legitimacy of Italian communists in the society after the war is put in question – and with it the Italian Constitution.

Stéphanie Prezioso analyses variants of the debate. One trend is to consider fascism and communism as equivalent and totalitarian – and propose general commemoration of „all victims“. The obvious question here (for those who were consistent anti-stalinists who could even compare certain methods and camps of the two regimes), is the absence of distinction between stalinism and communism, as if the Catholics and Catholic religion were to be identified with Inquisition. The second important problem in that assimilation, is the total lack of analysis of the respective aims and ideology of communism and fascism. Only such analyse permits to understand that stalinism can be and has been denounced from within communist ideals as contradictory to them, whereas fascism implements its ideas and racist ideology...

A sharp controversy developed in France for similar reason around the publication of Stéphane Courtois's *Black Book on Communism*19 in 1997. Important contributions were also produced about the use of the term „totalitarianism“20. In the Italian debate, S. Prezioso quotes another trend: to denounce the „blindness“ of antifascism, accepting alliances with communists... And that is a broad issue in the ex-Soviet Union and Eastern Europe with attempt to rehabilitate fascists as „democrats“.

Coming to the precise case of Italian occupation of Yugoslav territories, S. Preziosa stress how violent it had been (with 250 000 deads in 29 months), which is a key context to understand (even if not excuse) the lynchings and other „summary executions“ which did exist against about 10 000 fascists after the Liberation. She denies the statements accusing the Italian CP to have organized those executions, as non convincing if one takes in account the kind of line and practice the ICP had, and by all means, not proved. But in conclusion of her analysis, she raises two main aspects. First, „the historian's job is to put back the violence 'in the whole period and situation where it was born' ; a scientific role to-day forgotten by a part of the Italian historiography, when dealing with the Resistance“. The second aspect is the „horizon of legitimacy“ of violence which was – at that time – shared broadly by the whole Resistance.

From Official history to autistic economy and back to democracy

In economy, similar trends towards official theories - i.e „scientific“ thought, supposed to be out of historical contingencies, and „above“ social conflicts and politics – tended to suppress any legitimacy to alternative criteria of scientific research in economy and social sciences. My Institute

produced by the Western Britain's University in France.

of research, at Dauphine's University – IRISES : Institut de recherche interdisciplinaire en sociologie, économie, science politique – wants explicitly to cross views of different disciplines, and resist mainstream criteria. The tendancy to impose one single doctrine – which makes absolutely no scientific consensus among economists in the world – was strong in the 1990's. But resistances were also...

And in the ’1990s, in France a specific movement of revolt among students opposed what they called „autistic economy“. They launch a petition and a movement which has now international dimensions\(^{21}\). They wanted to oppose the trend of teaching economy as a „science“ having one and only thought (la „pensée unique“)... They have received a broad support.

But, it must be said that since the end of the 1990s, the main arguments against mainstream policies has come from... the reality of the world disorder ; from world reports coming from United Nation, and from a profound crisis of all institions of the „Washington consensus“. Amartya Sen's Indian Nobel Price encourages criticisms to mainstream criteria of efficiency\(^{22}\). Open criticism to the IMF policy\(^{23}\) have increased at the top of institutions themselves. The recent regroupment of several countries from Latin America to established their own banking system, based on cooperation, and increasing Chinese's capacity to directly finance South countries, represent a sharp blow to IMF. There is also now an open crisis of the World Trade Organisation unable to obtain the conclusion of any „round“ of negotiation since its creation – and confronted to the capacity of world campaign to resist or at least delegitimize trade or multinational policies acting against environment issues, health of millions of people, fundamental rights\(^{24}\)...

The ongoing economic and financial crisis now in the core countries of the system, will increase the delegitimation of recepees which pretended to offer the best financing through the free circulation of capital, and satisfaction of needs through market criteria.

But behind the gap between world evolution and what is under control of elected bodies, there is a rather universal ideological crisis and a crisis of representative democracy (gaps between public opinions and deputees, on war and social issues ; huge amount of abstentions ; popular feelings of no real choices in elections...). It proves that the reality of decision making on key stakes in societies does not belong to Parliament, that democracy cannot be reduced to multiparty elections... and that the existing democracy is inefficient without radical transformation of socio-economic decision making and democratic rights.

This gap between democratic rights and reality of decision making leads to the question : who

\(^{21}\)www.paecon.net is the web site of Post Autistic Economy.

\(^{22}\) Amartya Sen's Development as freedom, 1999, Alfred Knopf Inc, - and also his criticism on Western-centric concept of democracy...

\(^{23}\) One of the sharpest criticism came from within the institution, formulate by Joseph Stiglitz who resigned from his position as Chief Economist and Senior Vice-President of the World Bank from 1997 to 2000. He had also be a member of the Council of Economic Advisers from 1993-95, during the Clinton administration, and served as CEA chairman from 1995-97. His book Globalization and Its Discontents (W.W. Norton June 2001) was a sharp criticism of the IMF policies. In spite » of its open support to the demonstrations and criticisms against WTO and IMF, he received in 2001 what is called the « nobelprice » in Economy...

\(^{24}\) Look at United Nation development reports since 1998, based on Indicator of Human Development and taking in account inequalities and not only GDP ; look also at reports and analysis made by CADTM (Committee for the cancelation of the Third World's debts) www.cadtm.org.
decides, how, on the basis of what criteria and mechanism? That have been and still are the core issues of my research, both on the past Yugoslav selfmanagement system and on the existing transformations of those societies, within international set of world, European relationships and institutions.

Looking for possible „honnest“ and professionnal research, therefore opposing simplications and new official thinkings, means accepting pluralistic views including explicit subjective commitments of the researcher ; that does not mean „relativism“ and lack of ethic criteria based on long term trends of human societies and look for universal values. But the emphasis are to be put on the condition of open critical and international (democratic) research – as opposed to Western centric, eurocentric, ethnocentric, „male“-centric, or any corporate views...

The refusal of any (state or academical) monopole of knowledge also means openings to humanbeings in his/her diversity and movements of resistances of the civil society as a source of information, knowledge and resistance to „official memory“ and oppressive thinking... The actors of the Yugoslav past can still give their own memory, confront it to others. This is an important issue that Walter Benjamin's approach of history permits to integrate : looking for „holes“...

25 Very important and open debates do exist on the issue of « another world possible », in world forums, books, based on the experience of participative democracy, balancesheets of failures and successes... A synthetic presentation of those debates, linked with recent stakes like « ethics in trade » and also debates on selfmanagment can be found in Thomas Coutrot, Démocratie contre capitalisme , La Dispute, 2005