5. Money and Capital in the Human Ecology: Rethinking Mercantilism and 18th Century France

Guillaume Daudin
OFCE / Sciences Po (Paris)

I) Introduction

A) Mercantilism

In the language of human ecology as per Chapter 1, academic fields as well as schools of thought within a field are “belief systems,” i.e. “ways of organizing alleged truths and convictions.” Within economics, two of the most significant belief systems, historically, have been “mercantilism” and “neo-classical” framework. The “neo-classical” framework is now dominant in the economic profession, but the recent failure of the Doha round of trade talks shows that governments and economic leaders may actually believe in the “mercantilist” framework. Both are placeholders for heterogeneous school of thoughts that share some common ideas.

Following Adam Smith, early quantitative historians (called cliometricians after the Muse of history, Clio, and their taste for quantitative methods) challenged in the 1960s and 1970s the idea that empires and world-wide trade were important ingredients of European economic prosperity. They argued that trade with the empires and the rest of the world and its profits were too small to be of any significance for early modern European economies. They argued also that revenue from external settlements were smaller that what would have been gained if the same capital stock (including administrative and military costs) had been invested in mainland Europe; and even that restrictions on trade and the usage of excluding foreigners from colonial trade caused an increase in colonial goods prices which made the colonies a net liability for the domestic economies.
To these arguments it was replied that, considering the organization of the international economy, the real alternative to restrictive trade practices was not free trade, but predatory behavior from the foreign partners: there is no reason to think that prices would have been lower. Furthermore, seemingly non-profitable investments in the colonies were justified by diminishing returns, or the lack of investment opportunities, in the domestic economies. Some quarrels about numbers also took place, showing that, compared with the rather small amount of industrial and colonial investment during the 18th century, returns from the Empire were not that small. Keynesian developments affirmed that the Empire increased the effective demand in the economy. And, finally, the most ironic arguments in favor of the colonial systems evolve around the fact that slavery and Empires allowed different regions of the globe to be open to trade: this, according to basic trade economics, could only lead to a general increase in welfare. It also implies that the suppression of slave trade was a net loss for Africa, as its abolition actually reduced international movement of production factors (Engerman, 1972; O’Brien, 1982; Thomas, 1968; Coelho, 1973; Solow, 1985; Caves, 1971; Findlay, 1990; Darity, 1982).

B) Did Mercantilism Have a Fair Trial?

None of these discussions, even those arguing for the importance of European empires, uses a mercantilist belief system. Thus, their general conclusion is either that at least Europeans were not doing it the right way—it was a good idea to open transoceanic markets, but free trade would have done the trick better—nor for the right reasons. Yet, there is something wrong in this whole debate. It is that it uses classic and neo-classic models that may be valid for modern economies—and were devised to be such—but miss many important features of the ancien régime economy.
Crucially, the study of mercantilist external policies should not be separated from the study of the way domestic economies worked. Hence this chapter justifies and defends a mercantilist view of the relations between world trade and domestic prosperity. It does not try, though, to defend every mercantilist theory and practice. First, because they were often in contradiction with each other; second because many were economically unsound. More specifically, this chapter is not directly interested in trade tariffs (a simple price adjustment to the neoclassical economist), but rather in Navigation Acts-type trade policies, which gave domestic traders uncompetitive advantage over foreigners (a complicated intraspecies negotiation and individualized transaction to the human ecology economist). The aim is to devise a model that attains its aims through mechanisms that would have been recognized by mercantilists.

These belief systems have effects on social agreements and the way human populations deal with their physical environment to increase their wealth and welfare. As such, it is preposterous to analyze economic phenomena exclusively with the tools of one belief system when another belief system is dominant among a society. This chapter provides an example of this in the case of one of the major disputes within economics – to what degree has free trade, as advocated by neo-classical thinking, been more desirable for the nation state, as opposed to the aggressive export promotion, trade and financial protectionism advocated my mercantilism? The answer depends on the belief system that is dominant. The specific example investigated here concerns the “ancien régime” of France before the industrial revolution. This paper asks: “what are the mechanisms (i.e. elements of the human ecology) that would have been recognized by the mercantilists and were sustained in part by the mercantilist belief system, but which would not be recognized by neo-classical economists?”
Part of the answer is that 18th early modern mercantilists were very much aware of the difficulties inherent in economic exchange — a sub-variety of intraspecies negotiations and transactions. This corresponds to an important aspect of the human ecology approach which recognizes, as any natural science ecology approach that intraspecies negotiations and transactions are exploratory, adaptive, often individualized, and the outcomes are not known to all members of the species. This belief system has different consequences than the belief system of neo-classical economics in which transactions costs (a catch-all category for a variety of intraspecies activities) are assumed to be either trivial or not worth exploring except as a general constraint on the otherwise superior ‘efficiency’ of markets.

For example, if full information, to all, on intraspecies transactions is not available, as per the human ecology approach, the evolution of prices is not as straightforward, because prices cannot be changed by spontaneous unanimous social agreement. Thus, as the author finds in this chapter, money is not simply a veil on the real economies, but can actually play a major role, in the 18th century in determining the comparative and absolute prosperity of nations. Money, as an invisible element of the human ecology, or ‘social agreement,’ as well as related notions of ‘capital,’ within a complicated process of intraspecies negotiation and transaction, are shown to be system drivers; this recognition allows support for mercantilism over neo-classical economics in the specific context of the 18th century.

The links between this chapter and chapter 4 are obvious. It is probably the case that, despite the apparent dominance of the neo-classical belief system, money has nowadays the same importance in the global economy and can be an important determinant in the relative wealth and prosperity of nations. Three conclusions arrived at here, listed next as A, B, and C, for the ancien régime are consistent with Allen’s conclusions in Chapter 4 regarding current U.S. hegemony: (A) the ability of the human population working with the physical
environment and resources to produce wealth can be significantly affected by social agreements regarding the use of money and by financial institutions; (B) the ancien régime of the 18th century — and the U.S. in recent decades according to Chapter 4 — benefited from the inflow of foreign monetary wealth, which was used to expand domestic money, credit, economic growth, and wealth. This process allowed economic activity to be better coordinated and more efficient on a large scale, and, it encouraged more intensive production and consumption activities, especially with regard to labor force participation; (C) Compared to typical literature, the human ecology approach to economics might allow for better modeling of both the successful ancien régime and the 1990s U.S. prosperity. Typical literature has been puzzled by these two epochs, because it looks for the source of new economic growth more narrowly in technology, physical resources, and inherent labor productivity while assuming incorrectly that the impact of money, changing institutions, and international political power is fairly neutral. The root of this error is in the fact that it does not properly take into account belief systems and social agreements, in opposition to what is advocated by the human ecology approach.

England, like France, supported its economic growth before the industrial revolution period with massive amounts of imports and appropriation of wealth from its empire. The ‘Malthusian Trap’ of overpopulation and poverty was avoided, and human populations grew fast, as aided by new political-economic institutions and organizations, and by belief systems regarding work and exploitation of the physical environment and resources. Enhanced money transactions systems brought, especially, under-utilized rural labor into the formal economy in Britain as well as France. Thus, invisible, subjectively allocated money—itself a social agreement—was a ‘driver’ of human populations. And, exploitation of coal, and thus
railroads, steam engines, and other changes in *the physical environment and resources* all co-evolved with these other structural conditions in the human ecology.

**C) Outline**

The first step is to devise an appropriate ‘human ecology model’ of the domestic economy: this chapter argues that domestic prosperity depended crucially on the supply of circulating financial capital, because the main limit to economic activity was not production but transaction. The nature and role of “transaction,” so basic to inter-species negotiation, coordination and behavior in ecological models, is often ignored in neo-classical models; the latter may even assume the absence of transactions costs.

The second step is to show that, considering the state of financial markets, this supply of capital ultimately depended on the sign of the balance of ‘invisibles,’ as the net export flow of goods and services was compensated mainly by inflows of precious metals that formed the monetary base. Using endogenous growth theories, it is possible to show that the external sector could allow a way out of diminishing returns into unbounded domestic economic growth. Unlike neo-classical models, the human ecology framework thus allows ‘invisible’ money and capital transfers an important role as ecological ‘drivers’ of transactions, coordination, and productive activity. As per the framework of Chapter 1, the invisible can thus drive the visible conditions in a useful predictive sense.

The paper discusses all these points in the context of France in the 18th century. This context is crucial in a human ecology approach, as the structural conditions of economic are often unique to specific places and times. It adds a new set of evidence to the point developed by other essays in this collection: money is not simply a veil on the real economies, but actually plays a major role, in the 18th century as well as nowadays, in determining the comparative and absolute prosperity of nations.
II) On the importance of the invisible for the development of the visible French economy

Despite the usual clichés about pre-modern economies, the visible French economy was growing during the 18\textsuperscript{th} century. This depended crucially on the payment of transaction costs by traders that allowed other economic actors to integrate further into the domestic economy. “Thick/thin-markets” models were developed in the 1980s to explain the persistence of production factors under-utilization in the long run. Economic growth in France during the 18\textsuperscript{th} century can be viewed as a thickening of markets.

A) Population and resources

\textit{1) Economic growth}

Economic growth in France during the 18\textsuperscript{th} century was probably as fast as in England (the first presentation of this: Crouzet, 1966). According to \textit{Institut de Science Economique Appliquée} (ISEA) research, based on contemporaneous estimations, annual growth of the nominal Gross Physical Product between 1701-1710 and 1791-1794 was 1.2\%, from 1,470 million Livres to 4,059 m. L (Marczewski, 1961. This work owns a lot to Molinier, 1957). These macro results are compatible with what we know of the product at the beginning of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century (cf. Bourguignon & Levy-Leboyer, 1985). Their weakness lies in the quality of the data for the beginning of the period. As the population grew 0.24\% a year (Dupâquier & Lepetit, 1988 (1995)), this yields a per capita nominal growth of nearly 1\% a year.

(Insert Table 1: Gross Physical Product and Population)

Starting from sectoral evidence would yield the same result. Agricultural growth was faster than population growth, but not very much (Toutain, 1995). The rise in the production of wool products—the least dynamic of large French industries—was 1.15\% (Markovitch,
The growth of linen production can be estimated between 1.5% and 2% a year and of silk 2% (Léon, 1970 (1993)-a). Future “modern” industries were of course growing much faster, but they did not form an important part of the product and are less interesting. Apart from textiles, the other two large industries were farm product (including wine) and construction: no rate of growth of their production can be estimated. Yet, there is enough data to affirm that our global evaluation of GPP growth is plausible.

There is no reliable price index that could be used to deflate this number. However, Labrousse’s estimation of the evolution of agricultural prices from 1701-1710 to 1771-1789 can be used, and yields a per capita growth of 0.6%. The general evolution of prices is over-evaluated by the evolution of agricultural prices. Yet, this is probably compensated by the abnormally high prices caused by the Spanish succession war and the 1709 winter.

2) The existence of labor reserves

Technical progress only took off with the industrial revolution which happened in the beginning of the 19th century in France. In the absence of any exogenous productivity revolution, this growth was possible because more production factors were integrated into the domestic economy. There are three main visible production factors: land, capital and labor. The stock of land did not change. In so far as fixed capital played a small part in industrial production (Cf. Grenier, 1996, pp. 84-91; Chapman, 1973; Hudson, 1986, pp. 48-52; Cailly, 1993, pp. 203 et passim; Caspard, 1979, p 117; Dornic, 1955, pp. 206-208; Vardi, 1993, p. 131), any increase in the stock of capital was probably too small the explain the speed of growth. A large part of this speed must have come from a more extensive use of human labor.

This was only possible because, in direct opposition to what is usually said about “Malthusian” pre-modern economies, a large part of the labor of the French populations was
under-utilized. Demographics tell us that the potential size of the active population was 66%. Grantham has plausibly argue that only between 26% and 47% of it were needed to produce grain—including part-time workers required during harvest (Grantham, 1994). The proportion of agricultural workers in the actual active population at the end of the 18th century was 65% of an actual active population estimated at 43.5% of the total population (Marchand & Thélot, 1991). This can be interpreted in two ways. If the active population is well measured, 23% of the total population could have taken part in the work force and did not. If the active population has been under-estimated but if its distribution among sectors is right, between 18% and 39% of the active population were part of the agricultural population and were not needed — even part time — to produce grains. Many of them were probably occupied with the production of market agricultural goods, but it seems implausible that it was the case even for most of them.

Of course, considering the measurement difficulties, these numbers should be interpreted with caution. They show however—contrary to common wisdom about “blocked” early modern economies—that the basic subsistence activities required only a small part of the labor force. Hence, there were large reserves of labor in the countryside. Accordingly, an important potential source of growth was the extension of rural market activities, both industrial and agricultural.

**B) Cost of market participation and growth**

1) *A Smithian growth potential*

Something had to make worthwhile the integration of under-utilized rural labor in the economy. The claim of this paper is that it was the development of exchanges between different existing economic cells. This increased the number of potential patrons for rural
industries. The markets, to use Alfred Marshall’s words (Hall, 1991), gained in thickness. This allowed social returns to scale in the number of participants to increase labor effective productivity (For a review of different thick/thin markets type of models, and a reflection on their utility for the study of pre-industrial growth, cf. Grantham, 1997). Because of this movement between thin markets to thin markets, this growth phenomenon can be seen as “Smitihian”, as Adam Smith insisted on the importance of market integration for economic development. This chapter suggests one mechanism for such growth.

A non-integrated market can be compared to an archipelago economy. Social relations at the level of the canton (a five to ten km radius circle dominated by a market center) were probably strong enough to make the economy look like a perfectly competitive market. Hence, we consider them as the basic cell of economic life, as our “islands”: their number was nearly 5,000 in 18th century France. Peasant households in this island have the choice between producing autarkic goods which they can directly consume or participating in the market domestic economy by producing a specialized commercial goods, selling it and buying with the proceeds a basket of commercial goods coming from other economic cells.

Let us first consider a case where trading has no cost. Following the same kind of intuition as the “Big Push” models (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Murphy, Shleifer & Vishny, 1989), one can imagine two different kinds equilibria. When no canton produce market goods, a single canton which would like to start producing market goods would not do it, as it is not interested in the consumption of a single, highly specialized, market good. Hence no canton participate in the domestic market economy. However, if all cantons participate and production market goods, the offer of market goods for consumption is enticing enough that each canton has an interest in continuing its production of a specific market goods to be able to buy a basket of market goods. There is an optimal level of production of market goods that
can be reached if all the cantons can be convinced to produce enough. This level is probably larger than what is achievable by spontaneous market mechanisms. As each canton has monopoly power on its specialized market good production, it wants to reduce its own production to increase the price of its variety and increase the amount of its consumption. As everyone is playing this game, the actual production level is smaller than the optimum.

Moving from the “no market good production” situation to the “some market good production” situation is a form of one-time growth, as the economy moves between two equilibria. However, this transition is instantaneous and depends on a change in expectations. This could fit in the human ecology approach: the movement from one equilibrium to the other could be caused by a change in belief systems, as everyone, simultaneously, decided that market participation is a good thing, and in so doing made it sustainable. Yet, it does not describe French growth experience: one needs an explanation to the fact that growth was gradual. The suggestion of this chapter is that the costs of participating in the domestic economy were declining through time thanks to financial capital accumulation by the trader. But to understand that explanation, one needs to recognize the role of traders in the domestic economy

2) **The role of traders in the domestic economy**

Representing the domestic market economy as the results of transactions between isolated economic cells neglects the fact that the French market economy was organized around the traders. Except on the canton level, there were always middlemen between the producer and the consumer. Most areas were dealing with a huge part of the national market. Data about goods movements in France at the end of the period show that even the most backward rural areas were drawing goods from many different and distant places (Le Roux, 1996, pp. 135, 144…).
There are no comprehensive data or studies on the intensity of domestic trade. Nevertheless, the circulation of goods was probably growing faster than the nominal growth of industry: as each individual industry grew, it had to find consumers further and further away. The circulation of information, on which we have more information, was certainly growing fast: the nominal revenue of the Poste for example grew 3.4% a year—with declining prices—between 1738 and 1791. The revenue of fairs and tolls was also growing faster than global product (Léon, 1970 (1993)-b).

Someone had to deal with these goods movements. Accordingly, most districts had dynamic traders dealing potentially with the whole national market. A perfect example of this has been extensively studied in England (Willian, 1970). In France, the Colombo House in Nice can be said to be representative of these activities. It was quite a small firm of retailers that was drawing supply from as far as Normandy, using credit and commercial paper extensively. During the French Revolution, its traders showed they were dynamic entrepreneurs by regularly adapting their commercial networks to changing circumstances and trying to mount new speculations (Carlin, 1965). Traders were also responsible for the organisation of the production in numerous cases—as the abundant literature on proto-industrialisation has shown (For French examples: cf. Engrand, 1979, p. 68-70; Guignet, 1979, p. 29; Vardi, 1993, p. 194). Hence, traders were effectively allowing inter-canton transactions to be done.

That this operation was vital to the way the Ancien Régime economies worked can be shown by the social agreements embedded in the domestic industrial policies, notably the regulation system. It set down in a very precise way how each good should be. From the production point of view, the whole system seems to be inefficient. However, information was very valuable in the ancien régime’s economy and particularly difficult to obtain. In an
era when traders would trade whatever would come their way, identifying the quality of each product was impossible. The customers were even more liable to be cheated on what they were buying. No private trademark existed and thus no one could commit himself to the quality of a product—even if through privilege, a form of personal identification could be put on cloth (For an example, cf. Gayot, 1979, pp. 136-137). Products could become anonymous very quickly, because of multiple middlemen (This was all the more complex as quality did not only refer to the value usage of each good, but also to its integration in an a priori social hierarchy: Grenier, 1996 pp. 63-70; Reddy, 1984). Hence, transaction costs were very high: you had either to trust your partner or to implement a complete inspection of the good each time. Marques were a good way of partially solving the problem. First, it established a control. Also because the whole reputation of a town or production centre was at stake in case of fraud: some auto-monitoring took place. The real obligation was not for a trader to give fair information on the product - even if he should, no large or effective administration was going to control him. The main burden rested on the producer, who could only produce certain qualities and could neither introduce product or production innovations. Quality control helps trade and impedes production.

As such, it is a social control that reveals something important about the interplay of the structural conditions in 18th century-France human economic ecology. The idea that trade was more crucial than production was an important part of its belief system (the same kind of conclusion can be found in Bossenga, 1988. Studying the examples of Lille, Lyon, Paris and Orléans, he shows the way “by which merchants manipulated the corporate regulations in order to secure a monopoly over the sale of reputable goods produced by both urban artisans and rural weavers.”: pp. 694-695.)
3) The role of monetary capital in allowing transactions

The activity of traders can be divided in three parts. First, they were insuring the actual movement of goods along space and time (the cost of keeping inventories), along with their packaging and their bundling. They had to take precautions in order to insure that each member of the trading network behaved well. They had also to adapt to lack of information—even in the absence of misbehavior—and changing states of the market.

Some of the forms of capital needed by trader for their activity are familiar. On one hand, the exchange activities—especially their transformation side—require what we are used to calling capital in production economies: carts, buildings, i.e. fixed capital. This capital is of the same nature as in most economic models; it needs to be produced the usual way, through work and other capital. This is also the case of circulating capital: the wool that is to be threaded, the threads that are to be woven, etc.

They needed also what is usually called “merchant capital”: circulating financial capital to buy intermediary consumption used to package and present goods and the circulating capital embedded in each good as they kept inventories between its purchase and its sale.

They were tackling the problems of misbehavior with work entailed by the inspections and the capital needed to access the legal system that was supposed to enforce propriety rights. However, they could save dramatically on these operations if they had developed enough social and legal links with their partners. This stock could be inherited by offspring of a trading family; be produced out of social capital, by sending members of their family abroad; be produced in its own right out of their work—during travels or apprenticeship; be produced out of financial capital, by buying lands and offices which were tools of integration in a stable community and hence commitment to good behavior. This stock was also very fragile, and it was a commonplace to affirm that nothing was at the same time more precious
nor more fragile that a reputation—the other term for a large stock of social capital (Cf., among numerous examples: how the Pellet brothers started their carrier by sending one of them in the West Indies Cavignac, 1967; the frequent travels of Pourtalès—knowledge capital was also accumulated in this case: Bergeron, 1970; and the catastrophic effect for Lacoube’s trade and credit of the misbehavior of his nephews: Cornette, 1986). However, there is no machinery that can be used to build up reputation capital. One way to do it is to expend part of one’s wealth to show the commitment—this wealth only has to be symbolic. This is similar to a “bond” approach to social capital and reputation.

Tackling the problems of market uncertainties and changeability required traders to spend time in getting information from all their correspondents and interpreting it. Yet, they could also save on this by using their own knowledge of the market. We can represent this by a stock of market-cultural capital: a mix of tricks, best practice and knowledge. Most of this knowledge could only be transmitted with difficulty. Experience of a particular type of network or of market could only be the fruit of day-to-day operations once traders had created the first link. To create this link they had to stake a lot of money, suffer many rebuffs and learn from them (The cost of this was less important if it was done during apprenticeship. Cf. for example Thomson, 1982, p. 302). Hence, traders were sacrificing the money they could get from operations that they were acquainted with in order to get a larger stock of knowledge capital.

(Insert Table 3: different types of capital)

Hence, even though the development of transactions required specific production factors, they were highly personal and bound to depreciate very quickly. However both social and
knowledge capital could be increased through a costly transformation of monetary capital. This capital was not the ideal transaction factor, but it was the easiest to exchange and socially accumulate. Hence, in the absence of institutional transformations, what was crucial for the long-run development of transactions was the accumulation of circulating monetary capital.

That was actually the case in France. Arnould estimated that the circulating stock of metallic money grew 0.8% a year between 1715 and 1788 (Arnould, 1791, p. 153). This number is compatible with the growth rate of 0.785% a year between 1700 and 1788 computed by modern searchers Riley & Cusker, 1983, p. 280). The total stock was approximately two billion livres at the end of the period—half the value of the physical product. This specie stock was not the whole money stock, which was also composed of commercial papers like the bills of exchange. Yet, according to the sketchy evidence we have, an increase of the real money stock and hence of the circulating monetary capital stock seems a very plausible description of the 18th century situation.

Traders accumulated capital and increased the amount of means of transaction they controlled. The best way to employ this capital in order to increase their profits was to increase the integration of rural producers into the domestic market economy. This is an explanation for French economic growth in the 18th century that is compatible with the beliefs systems and social agreements that can be observed in there (This model is formalized in Daudin (2002) and Daudin (2005)). France was not at the forefront of the development of the economic economy. That explains why there was still benefits to be reaped from the development of national markets, even if, in the Chapter 3, this is seen as a very early innovation associated with Sung China. Certainly, the Low Countries, for example, already benefited from a nearly full commitment of their producers in the domestic market economy.
by the 18th century. That was not yet the case in France. However, France did participate into Amerasian trade, associated with the late 17th century – early 18th century K-wave. The next section shows how that sector encouraged increased integration of the domestic market.

III) On the role of external trade in accumulating circulating financial capital

This section discusses chryshedonism — the attachment to the increase of the stock of precious metals in the economy — and the important role of predatory external trade in allowing a much more important growth. Both of these were important tenets of the mercantilist belief system.

A) The real effects of species

1) The non-neutrality of the real stock of money

Promissory bills, exchange bills, commercial credit: the preceding section has proffered the idea that money largo sensu was the capital that mattered for growth in 18th century France. To think of money as capital is not common in economics. It cannot be avoided, though, if one accepts the fact that making transactions is a proper economic activity that should be studied for itself. This can even be extracted from such a money-veil theorist as J.S. Mill:

“There cannot, in short, be intrinsically a more insignificant thing, in the economy of society, than money; except in the character of a contrivance for sparing time and labour. It is a machine for doing quickly and commodiously, what would be done, though less quickly and commodiously, without it [...] The introduction of money does not interfere with the operation of any of the Laws of Value laid down in the preceding chapters.[...] Things which by barter would exchange for one another, will, if sold for money, sell for an
equal amount of it, and so will exchange for one another still” (Mill, 1909 (1848), book III, chpt. VII, §3, p. 488).

The last part of this quote is quite typical; here the first part is more interesting. The use of the term machine is telling. What John Stuart Mill is saying about money could be said as well of any machinery or other fixed capital. What is a tool, a device, a machine, if not “a machine for doing quickly and commodiously, what would be done, though less quickly and commodiously, without it”? Capital is a device that helps to save on other production factors. If money helps to save on production factors, can it be considered as capital, in the mercantilist way (Cf. Locke in Heckscher, 1935 (1994), t. II p. 203-204)? Obviously, in a pure production world, where transactions do not require the use of resources, as money could not help production, money could not be capital. However, that is not the case in actual economies. Transactions are important: and somehow the society must pay their cost. If money can help, it is right to consider it as capital.

Is it possible to increase a real stock of money? Augmenting a stock of capital is conceptually an easy task, as one has just to add more machines and tools. Increasing the stock of money is trickier. Money is only important as a symbol of real wealth: real money. However, the nominal stock of money is not neutral on prices, and an increase in the nominal stock of money will not lead to an increase in the real stock of money if prices adjust. This can be studied in a variant of Hume’s experiment. If the nominal money stock is divided by two overnight, and if everyone knows it, prices should decrease as well and the real money stock should stay the same. According to what everyone thinks money is, if everyone know about this division of the nominal stock, everyone would expect to see the price of money multiplied by two, whatever is the situation. As a consequence, prices would be divided by two. Yet, this implies rational expectations, knowledge of the neo-classical models of money
and, more important, perfect information on the evolution of private stocks of money of everybody.

The contrast between neo-classical models, and the human ecology approach to economics, is obvious here: in the human ecology approach, as per any ecological approach, intraspecies negotiations and transactions are exploratory, adaptive, often individualized, and the outcomes are not known to all members of the species. If full information, to all, on intraspecies transactions is not available, as per the human ecology approach, the evolution of prices is not as straightforward, because prices cannot be changed by spontaneous unanimous social agreement. There are two main effects that may change the output in the long term. The first effect of the discrete shock is to disorganize exchanges, as agents have to renegotiate new contracts to take the modification into account. The demand and supply curves for each good are modified. Sellers face buyers who ask for lower prices. This can only engage distrust: are they giving their practice to someone else? Why do they want the prices to decrease? They are themselves more eager to get money to compensate their mysterious loss. The terms of transactions have to be changed, and new relationships must be implemented. Relation-specific human and social capital become obsolete as relations are changed and the very process of renegotiation requires the use of new transaction goods to get back to the status quo ante. Hence, even if this is possible, the stock of transaction goods is reduced in the economy: the costs in nominal price changes are in itself important (The whole point of new Keynesian literature is to show that small menu costs may have large effects on the aggregate. The point here is that the cost of changing nominal price is not small—because it entails transaction costs and the destruction of social and human capital. For a textbook presentation of new Keynesian views on that: (Romer, 1996 #2892, pp. 276-302. For a collection of articles: Mankiw & Romer, 1991, vol. 1, pp. 29-211)).
The second effect takes place if prices do not adjust fully to the modification of the stock of money. How prices react depends on the way bargaining takes place among the population. If a Walrasian (tâtonnement or an efficient broker) process takes place, no transaction is implemented before the prices take into account the information of the decrease of the nominal stock of money: prices should adjust fully, are divided by two and the stock of real monetary wealth in the economy does not change. However, this is probably not the case. If for any reason prices adjust only slowly, for example with a one-period lag, or partly because of the menu costs studied before, the stock of real monetary wealth in the economy is reduced. In consequence, the means to create social and human capital in subsequent periods are divided by whatever is the evolution of the real stock of money. Furthermore, symbolic relations which allow the building of trust may be subject to nominal illusion and will not adapt at all. As in many monetarist and new classical models, an unexpected modification of the money supply has an effect on output. Contrary to them, thought, this short-term nominal shock has a long-term effect because the modification of prices changes directly the assets stock of the economy (An example of these models is the Lucas-Phelps one of limited information, in which agents do not know if evolution in prices are due to changes in relative or absolute prices: Lucas, 1972 and Phelps, 1970. For a presentation and a discussion: Romer, 1996, pp. 242-251. This model is interesting in our case because its imperfect information hypothesis looks like ours. For a study of new classical economics: Hoover, 1988).

Hence, the Humian result has very little reasons to be expected: P being the only variable reacting to the decrease of M in \( MV = PT \) (Cambridge Equation: Money stock times the Velocity of money is equal to the level of Prices and the amount of Transactions). T is decreasing too, as may be V. The level of transaction actually decreases in the long term
following a large discrete nominal shock. Even though the value of money is symbolic, the way its pricing is organized and the importance of transaction costs makes possible for a discrete nominal shock to have a long term real effect.

Furthermore, no actual modification in the stock of money will follow Hume's situation. People are affected in different manners by the evolution of the money stock in the economy. Increasing the money stock in the hands of traders who put it into circulation has certainly not the same effect as increasing the peasants' hoarding stock.

2) The role of species in the ancien régime’s monetary system

Chapter 4 has defended the idea that the control of the monetary base by the United States, in the form of the U.S. $, gave in the late 20th century a decisive advantages to this country. In the same way, the control of the monetary base was a decisive question for the increase in the stock of money in France and hence for the growing integration of producers into the national market economy. Because of different belief systems and social agreements, the monetary base was obviously not the stock of some national currency in the 18th century: it was the stock of precious metals.

Money is in essence a problem of convention. That is why in all monetary systems a continuous process of money creation is always possible. In France during the 18th century, there was no real banking system. Hence, most money creation was undergone by commercial agents. By issuing bills of exchange, which they would remit only some time after, perhaps with other commercial papers, or by extending commercial credit, agents were simply creating means of exchange—that is money (An approach to these conceptual problems: Bernanke & Blinder, 1988. For an empirical study: Carrière, Courdurié, Gutsatz & Squarzoni, 1976, pp. 49-71). All the more, as the flexibility of the use of commercial papers was very high in the 18th century (Cf. Roover, 1953; Carrière et al., 1976). However, this
system was completely decentralized and the fruit of each agent’s uncoordinated behavior. If a trader had a good reputation, it would be easy for him to place his promissory bonds. On the contrary if he was not trusted, he would probably find it impossible to do any commercial operation except with the support of high-powered money, i.e. precious metals. At a macroeconomic level, the amount of accepted money in the economy would be in close relation with the size of the monetary base, i.e. the amount of precious metal. This result is intuitive. Imagine an economy where commercial paper circulates without any means of personal insurance on its backing in precious metal. Creditors ask randomly to be repaid in precious metal. This has a domino effect on their debtors who, in order to face their obligation, demand the same of their own debtors. The smaller the stock of precious metal in the economy, the more difficult it will be to satisfy these commands. If this is not possible, exceptional shocks would result in failures and more generally in a brutal contraction of the money supply in the economy (This problem was important in the 1930s. Cf. Bernanke, 1995. Mercantilists were aware of it: Heckscher, 1935 (1994), t. II pp. 221-224, 231-237). Hence, the smaller is the monetary base compared to the monetary mass, the less stable is the whole system.

Furthermore, each extremity of the trade chain—producers and consumers—were not integrated in the commercial financial system: the only form of money they accepted was species. Hence, the real monetary supply was closely related to the stock of precious metal in the economy. Its increase was the aim of chryshedonist mercantilist policies.
B) A role for mercantilist policies toward trade

1) French mercantilist policies and their achievement

The aim of external mercantilist trade policies was not as much to “protect” domestic production as to maximize the payment balance surplus—and hence inward species flow. They planned on doing that not only thanks to a positive trade balance in goods, but also by encouraging the sale of trading services by French actors to the rest of the world.

This is clear in the following text by Colbert in which he analyses Franco-Dutch trade at the beginning of the reign of Louis XIV. At that time, Dutch traders controlled a large part of French maritime trade, external and domestic. His argument is that although French exports were 12 to 18 million Livres a year, only 4,5 to 6 millions of Livres entered as species each year since the Dutch were paying the French using:

- Maritime freight between French ports: 3 million
- Colonial goods coming from the French islands: 2 million
- Fine clothes, Indian goods, spices, silk, etc.: 3 million
- Goods coming from Northern Europe and naval stores: 1.5 million

“Their ingenuity and our weak-mindedness has been so high that, through the agents they were able to install in every ports of the kingdom, having become the masters of all trade and navigation, they were able to dictate the price of all the goods they sell or buy.”

(Clément, 1861-1882, t. II, p. CCLXIX, quoted in Deyon, 1969, p. 100)

There is more than the usual balance of trade theory in this text. Colbert realizes that the main Dutch imports in France were not Dutch-produced goods, but shipping profit or re-exportation. What is more, the second paragraph stresses that the real problem is the trade position of the Dutch that allows them to make huge commercial profits. What Colbert was
complaining about was not Franco-Dutch trade as such, but rather the numerous imports in freight and commercial services caused by the weakness of French traders.

The idea was that trade was to a certain extent a zero-sum game and that each country should help its own traders to get as much as possible from it. The usage of state resources taken from the whole economy in order to secure monopoly profit was but a way of giving back to traders some of the externalities to which the multiplication of exchanges stimulated by their private activity gave rise.

A century later, France had in effect taken control of many of these activities, notably by re-exporting colonial products to the whole of continental Europe—effectively controlling a large part of trade between continental Europe and the West Indies. On a smaller scale, the taking over of some parts of inter-Asian trade had the same effect and also yielded important revenues (Haudrère, 1989; Manning, 1996). The distribution of these gains had been decided by the incessant commercial wars and commercial diplomatic agitation of the 18th century, notably between France and England. By losing Canada and keeping its West Indies possessions after the worst part of this struggle in 1763, France kept the most profitable part of its Empire and removed a cause for solidarity between England and the Thirteen Colonies. Only during the Wars of the Revolution would England eventually win the Second Hundred Years War.

(Insert Table 6: Evolution of French trade)

French dynamism can be read in the evolution of French external trade, which is quite well known (On the production of French trade statistics, cf. Beaud, 1964). The main aggregate data (from Bruyard (former head of the Bureau de commerce), cited in Romano, 1957) gives a growth rate of +2.25% p.a. between 1716-1720 and 1776-1780. The other
important set of data is Arnould's one—Arnould was second-in-command of the Bureau. It implies a growth of +2.34% p.a. between 1716-1720 to 1784-1788: the results are not so different, especially if we remember that 1778-1783 was a time of maritime war with England and hence that Bruyard’s figures for the end of the period are abnormally small (his numbers are higher than English ones. For a synthesis on these: Thomas & McCloskey, 1981). According to Arnould’s figure, the openness of the French economy (the ratio between the mean of imports and exports and the GDP) at the end of the period was more than 14%. If we consider services were 17% of GDP (Data from Bourguignon & Levy-Leboyer, 1985 for 1820), this yields an usual measure of openness of a bit less than 12%. The structure of this trade corresponds to what we have pointed out. From 1716 to 1787, the growth rate of exports in manufactured product to the rest of Europe was only 1.5% p.a. whereas the growth rate in re-exports of colonial products was 2.7% p.a. This last sector represented as much as four-tenths of French exports to Europe.

2) **Effect of mercantilist policies**

As mercantilists knew, external trade was the only means for a country to get a steady inward flow of precious metals and restrictive trade practices were the best way to make this flow as high as possible. There are two sides to this argument.

As domestic production of precious metals was negligible, the external world was their only possible source. During the 18th century, European production of precious metals was very small (Even the famous Maria-Theresa Thalers were minted out of American silver rather than from German one: Dermigny, 1954). It is a commonplace to say that Europe was the relay between the production in the Western Hemisphere and the hoarding of precious metals in Asia. The problem for Europe was to keep them as long as possible (On why the pure Ricardian specie flow mechanism could not apply to relations between America, Europe
and Asia: Blitz, 1967), and the aim of each country was to get as large as possible a share of this scarce commodity.

For numerous reasons, it is very difficult to compute the current account balance. Even if the global export and import values are trustworthy, the difference between them is probably not. Furthermore, that would give us only information on the trade balance, not the balance of invisibles. I have tried to compute the balance of invisible in Daudin (2006) for a specific year. Yet, beside the balance of invisible, there were other leaks in the system — hoarding, political expenses abroad — that prevented the evolution of the stock of species to be equal to the trade balance.

Another effect of external trade was to encourage capital accumulation by domestic trader. For that, external trade had to yield higher rates of return than domestic uses of capital. This can be checked.

It has been argued that capital was in fact in excess in the economy, and was often invested in productive ventures with difficulty — this is in apparent contradiction with the presentation we have made of circulating financial capital being the limiting factor in production. This paradox can be explained by the non-substitutability of a large number of forms of capital — most notably hoarding by all classes of society — with the actual circulating financial capital in the hands of traders. Capital was not a homogenous good. Its characteristic depended on who was using it, or rather on the specific and personal forms of social capital and knowledge it was completed by. Hence, any activity that could transmit it from the other classes of society to dynamic traders was growth enhancing.

Two different families of arguments can be used to show that profits were higher in external than internal trade. The first one is empirical, and based on microeconomic study of actual profits. It was made based on a large database of profit rates in Daudin (2004). Profits
in external trade were only around 6% — far from the very high numbers that were advertised in the literature. Yet, this was 40% higher — taking into account risk, duration and liquidity — that what was available in the rest of the economy.

Another family of arguments, macroeconomic and theoretical, also exist. External trade was also the realm of politics, conflict and power. This implies that there was a lot of rent seeking for the profit of traders, looked favorably over by the state. Accordingly, many cliometricians would agree that the only reason why the Empire was kept is that it yielded high premium profits to traders and planters (Coelho, 1973). Yet; as in a simple economic framework it is difficult to explain why rates of returns on capital should be constantly higher in one sector; most of them would at the same time defend the idea that the organization of colonial trade, notably slave trade, was competitive and should not have given higher returns than domestic trade (Thomas & Bean, 1974). These two sides of the argument are unmistakably contradictory. To use Smith’s words, why would a government influenced by shopkeepers go into important sacrifices to preserve a system that was not even profitable to shopkeepers? The second hypothesis can be more readily dropped than the first one.

Indeed, external speculation yielded much more scope for profits than domestic transactions. The quality of capital needed for a relationship between two continents, or even two different countries was different from what was needed for domestic trade. Knowledge and social capital were often relations-specific, and they were in even shorter supply in this case—hence the higher apparent rate of return on money capital. Even money-capital was specific, as the usage of commercial papers was more difficult in these relationships. Capital immobilization and risks were much higher: considering the probable risk-aversion and preference for the liquidity of agents, it would be only fair that profit rates should be higher.
Moreover, the suggestion that external trade was competitive can certainly be contested. The small number of towns controlling colonial trade, their specialization and the existence of strong social structures that facilitated co-ordination encouraged oligopoly. The important activity of the *Chambres de Commerce* and *Députés de Commerce*, institutions created at the beginning of the century to legalize and facilitate lobbying, are one proof that the caste of *négociants* had a real sense of solidarity. The way local institutions worked is another one. The group also ensured its coherence by constant social interactions (Cf. Carrière, 1973, pp 211-236 for the example of Marseille).

What is more, if profits had not been higher in the external sector, how could we explain the much more rapid growth of external trade compared to the domestic economy and the constant attraction by port cities of trader migrants? This fact alone would indicate that premium profits were indeed being secured. A last point, of course, is that the “small country” hypothesis is at least partly valid here. Compared to the rest of the world, the activities of France (in Europe and the World), or even Core Europe for that matter, were small. Hence, an increase in the activity of French traders could not have a large depressing impact on worldwide trade profits.

To sum up, it is plausible that external trade offered a potential for higher profits than any domestic use of capital—even if this potential may have been overstated by the old conventional wisdom. Hence, the encouragement of trading activity abroad by mercantilists policies had an effect on species accumulation a mechanism linked to “endogenous growth” theory. The “productive” specie supply was the one in the hands of traders. Their incentive to accumulate specie was linked both to their ascetic behavior (or small preference for the present) and to the returns yielded by circulating financial capital in the domestic economy. As these returns were decreasing, the capital stock accumulation was bound to be smaller
than what would be needed to reap the maximum social profits from division of labor. However, according to the predictions of “heart of growth” models (Rebelo, 1991; Glachant, 1995 Lucas, 1988), if traders could have access to a sector with a lower bound on the returns of capital, and insubstantial needs in primary factors (i.e. factors which cannot be freely accumulated, like land and labor), they will tend to accumulate capital without limits as long as it can help goods production. In so far as we are looking for a sector with no links to labor and land, the profits we are interested in are not so much those associated with a positive balance of trade *stricto sensu* as those associated with the positive balance of invisibles including commercial and shipping profits. These activities, often overlooked, play an important role in the accumulation of capital in France during the 18th century, as they do nowadays in the accumulation of capital in offshore markets—which is a source of the “money mercantilist” profits currently accumulating in the U.S., as argued by Allen in Chapter 4.

Because of these two effects, it was socially optimal to allow traders to make supra-normal profits in the external sector in order to encourage capital accumulation. That was one of the effects of mercantilist policies.

**IV) Conclusion**

We have shown that a main potential source of growth in *ancien régime* economies was Smithian. Transactions, traders and money played a central role in allowing this growth to occur. In the absence of a proper banking system, the stock of money depended crucially on the stock of precious metals in the economy. Hence, chryshedonist mercantilist policies aiming at increasing the share of species of each country through a positive balance of invisibles were growth enhancing.
As in the contemporaneous financial world system, core countries were able to attract species for the benefit of their domestic economies. There was, actually, already an international finance system. However, it was mainly concerned with national debts and its movement only very rarely had any effect on the commercial financial system, and even less on the monetary base. Hence, this extraction of species was only possible through trade and the export both of goods and of services.

V) Bibliography


Tilly, Ch. (1964). The Vendée. London : Edward Arnold.


Table 1: Gross physical product and population
Table 3: different types of capital

- **Fixed Capital**
  - Very small in Ancien Régime Economies

- **Transaction Capital**
  - Intermediary Consumption
  - Monetary Capital
    - Knowledge Capital
      - High rate of depreciation
  - Social Capital
    - High rate of depreciation

- **Production Capital**

- **Circulating Capital**
  - Domestic commercial papers (e.g. bills of exchange)
    - Can only be used with difficulty outside the trading community
    - Are subject to runs
  - Species (e.g. gold and silver)
    - Widely accepted
    - Form the monetary base
  - Exterior commercial papers (e.g. on the Dutch)
    - Can only be used with difficulty outside the trading community
    - Are immune to domestic runs
Table 6: Evolution of French Trade