Access to financing, rents, and organization of the firm

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Title:	Access to financing, rents, and organization of the firm
Author:	Renucci, Antoine
Type:	Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date de création:	2008
Résumé en anglais:	This paper provides a theory for the choice of an organizational structure by the headquarters of a unitary structure concerned about overload. The headquarters can avoid overload by delegating operational decisions to divisions, i.e., moving the firm to a multidivisional structure. We show that under moral hazard these divisions receive rents for incentive purposes, and that the multidivisional structure is able to invest more. Thus, there is a trade-off between increasing investment and paying rents. We also show that this trade-off applies to situations where firms consider engaging in acquisitions and joint ventures, or where entrepreneurs consider resorting to venture capitalists.
Lien vers un document non conservé dans cette base:	http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00365983/en/
Indexation documentaire:	Organisation et finances d'entreprise
Sujet(s):	Gouvernance d'entreprise; Rationnement du crédit; Credit rationing; Agency rents; Unitary-form; Forme fonctionnelle; Forme multidivisionnelle; Multi-divisional form
JEL Code:	G32; G34; G3
URL de la notice:	http://basepub.dauphine.fr/xmlui/handle/123456789/1020
PUBLIE DANS
Nom de la revue:	Journal of corporate finance
Volume:	14
Numéro:	4
Parution:	09-2008
Pages:	337-346
Editeur:	Elsevier
Réf. Version publiée:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.03.001