Access to financing, rents, and organization of the firm

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Access to financing, rents, and organization of the firm

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Title: Access to financing, rents, and organization of the firm
Author: Renucci, Antoine
Type: Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date de création: 2008
Résumé en anglais: This paper provides a theory for the choice of an organizational structure by the headquarters of a unitary structure concerned about overload. The headquarters can avoid overload by delegating operational decisions to divisions, i.e., moving the firm to a multidivisional structure. We show that under moral hazard these divisions receive rents for incentive purposes, and that the multidivisional structure is able to invest more. Thus, there is a trade-off between increasing investment and paying rents. We also show that this trade-off applies to situations where firms consider engaging in acquisitions and joint ventures, or where entrepreneurs consider resorting to venture capitalists.
Lien vers un document non conservé dans cette base: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00365983/en/
Indexation documentaire: Organisation et finances d'entreprise
Sujet(s): Gouvernance d'entreprise; Rationnement du crédit; Credit rationing; Agency rents; Unitary-form; Forme fonctionnelle; Forme multidivisionnelle; Multi-divisional form
JEL Code: G32; G34; G3
URL de la notice: http://basepub.dauphine.fr/xmlui/handle/123456789/1020
PUBLIE DANS
Nom de la revue: Journal of corporate finance
Volume: 14
Numéro: 4
Parution: 09-2008
Pages: 337-346
Editeur: Elsevier
Réf. Version publiée: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.03.001

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